Sandy effects

A short note hoping that everyone stays safe--warm and protected--from the effects of Hurricane Sandy pounding the American east coast.

Are GOP Presidents bad for Israel?

Last week (Tuesday 23rd) Efraim Halevy (Director of the Mossad from 1998 to 2002 and the national security adviser to the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, from October 2002 to June 2003) wrote an op-ed piece in the New York Times "Who Threw Israel Under the Bus?" in which he suggests that Israel fares worse under Republican US Presidents than Democrat ones.

Indeed, whenever the United States has put serious, sustained pressure on Israel’s leaders — from the 1950s on — it has come from Republican presidents, not Democratic ones. This was particularly true under Mr. Obama’s predecessor, George W. Bush.

While in terms of the facts, he's correct. George HW Bush, and especially his Secretary of State James A. Baker III, were particularly brutal toward Israel. However, I'm not sure, as a  general rule, Halevey placed the issue within the best context. Each administration has its own set of issues and demands in part determined by the time in history, the international situation ... So while it may be true, what does it mean for the 2012 elections? That despite the strong pro-Israel rhetoric from Mitt Romney Israel needs to gird itself for a 'rough ride' if he's elected? That despite the criticism leveled at Barack Obama he'll (continue) to be good for Israel? I'm not sure that it's the correct message.

Part of the piece includes:

Despite the Republican Party’s shrill campaign rhetoric on Israel, no Democratic president has ever strong-armed Israel on any key national security issue. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, it was a Republican, Dwight D. Eisenhower, who joined the Soviet Union in forcing Israel’s founding father, David Ben-Gurion, to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula after a joint Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt.In 1991, when Iraqi Scud missiles rained down on Tel Aviv, the administration of the first President Bush urged Israel not to strike back so as to preserve the coalition of Arab states fighting Iraq. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir resisted his security chiefs’ recommendation to retaliate and bowed to American demands as his citizens reached for their gas masks.After the war, Mr. Shamir agreed to go to Madrid for a Middle East peace conference set up by Secretary of State James A. Baker III. Fearful that Mr. Shamir would be intransigent at the negotiating table, the White House pressured him by withholding $10 billion in loan guarantees to Israel, causing us serious economic problems. The eventual result was Mr. Shamir’s political downfall. The man who had saved Mr. Bush’s grand coalition against Saddam Hussein in 1991 was “thrown under the bus.”In all of these instances, a Republican White House acted in a cold and determined manner, with no regard for Israel’s national pride, strategic interests or sensitivities. That’s food for thought in October 2012.

And then there's the issue of "The Road Map" which he claims Israel was strong armed to accept because America was anxious to get Great Britain (Tony Blair as PM) on board for the first Iraq War.

Just as the British Parliament was about to approve the joint venture, a group of Mr. Blair’s Labour Party colleagues threatened to revolt, demanding Israeli concessions to the Palestinians in exchange for their support for the Iraq invasion. This demand could have scuttled the war effort, and there was only one way that British support could be maintained: Mr. Bush would have to declare that the “road map” for Middle East peace, a proposal drafted early in his administration, was the formal policy of the United States.
Israel’s prime minister at the time, Ariel Sharon, had been vehemently opposed to the road map, which contained several “red lines” that he refused to accept, including a stipulation that the future status of Jerusalem would be determined by “a negotiated resolution” taking into account “the political and religious concerns of both sides.”... March 13, 2003, senior Israeli officials were summarily informed that the United States would publicly adopt the draft road map as its policy. Washington made it clear to us that on the eve of a war, Israel was expected to refrain from criticizing the American policy and also to ensure that its sympathizers got the message [and]  that the road map be approved without any changes, saying Israel’s concerns would be addressed later. ...
From that point on, the road map, including the language on Jerusalem, became the policy bible for America, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations. Not only was Israel strong-armed by a Republican president, but it was also compelled to simply acquiesce and swallow the bitterest of pills.

OK. But what about Nixon, George W Bush? Then there are the issues that Obama, Clinton and Carter pressured Israel.

The bottom line is that America and its President (and Congress too) needs to advance the American Interest. Israeli interests are nice to think about but, when push comes to shove, American interests ALWAYS trump non-American ones, including Israel. I would expect the same from Israel to place her interests above all other countries.

So while Israel may value, and need, American support Israel and every country needs to keep in mind De Gaulle's adage "countries have no friends only interests."

Happy elections

Right on or write off?

This evening [Thursday 25.10.2012] the Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu parties announced they have unified and will run as one list in the upcoming Israeli elections.

Is this the start of electoral reform--the start of creating large political blocs to govern Israel--or an act of desperation by either or both parties?

On one hand, there is an expectation that the merger will lead to sizable majority of seats. As Jonathan Liss in Haaretz writes:

Yisrael Beiteinu officials estimate that the unification should earn them at least 50 mandates in the upcoming election, and allow the new party to create a strong, stable government, without having to cater to other parties demands in exchange for votes.

That part sounds good. An end to cobbling together smaller parties--each exacting its ransom (extortion) to join the government--to reach a majority government.

On the other hand, the idea that two large egos, Netanyahu and Lieberman, who has sparred with each other for the last decade or two to see who is the real leader of "The Right" will actually commit to working together for the next few months (of the campaign) never mind the next four years (the term of office). My sense is someone sees this as just another battle of a larger war for supremacy. The whole exercise implode creating a bigger mess than currently exists. 

This could also create a renewed opportunity for the other parties especially for the not-right wing parties. 

It's a big gambit, as Chami Shalev discusses. 

According to press reports, Netanyahu is relying on public opinion polls that promise his joint list with Lieberman between 40-45 Knesset seats, within the same range as the 42 seats currently held by the Likud and Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu combined. Such a result would ensure that the Likud-Beiteinu list, as it is now called, will be the biggest in the next Knesset and that Netanyahu will be the certain candidate to form the next coalition.

But Netanyahu should know better than most that political polling of hypothetical situations is notoriously unreliable, because it fails to take into account the influence of the new entities on the other actors in the arena. By desperately seeking a master stroke that would counter Likud’s slide in the polls, Netanyahu may have forgotten what sociologist Robert K Merton described as the “imperious immediacy of interest” from which the law of unintended consequence ensues.

• Will the Russian supporters of Yisrael Beiteinu shift their votes to Likud or find another olim [immigrant] party to support?
• Will traditional North African voters, hitherto the bedrock of Likud support, remain loyal to the Netanyahu-Lieberman combo – or will they cry “the Russians are coming, the Russians are coming” and flock to Shas and to its old-new icon, Aryeh Deri?
• What about the bloc of so-called “Feiglinim”, the right-wing settlers in the Likud who had been poised for a power grab in the upcoming Likud primaries and who have now been outflanked by Lieberman? Will they stay or will they go further to the right?
• How will the last vestiges of the old Likud guard, who still swear by the rule of law and adhere to what is known as “Jabotinskyite majesty” - people such as Michael Eitan, Dan Meridor and even Benny Begin – how will they react to having someone like Lieberman, whom they have all castigated at one time or another, catapulted to the top?  Perhaps they will join forces and add legitimacy to the new Olmert or Livni led center?
• Will this union galvanize despondent center-left voters, hitherto resigned to their bloc’s inevitable defeat in the upcoming elections, and increase pressures on former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and/or former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni to return to politics in order to rally and unite the troops and lead the charge against the Lieberman-led right?

Then, will Lieberman's presence serve as a distraction or thorn to outsiders and those trying to spin Israel in a positive light? My sense is that Lieberman's public persona is problematic. While being direct and controversial helps generate press and attention to your political agenda, it's not helpful when dealing with diplomacy and an already hostile foreign press/media.

Lastly, 

with Lieberman involved, one must always consider a Machiavellian subplot: Lieberman, after all, wants to be prime minister. He knows it, Netanyahu knows it, and they both know that each other knows it. Netanyahu may have embraced Lieberman in order to neutralize the possibility that the leader of Yisrael Beiteinu might decide to bolt the right and join a centrist coalition after the upcoming elections. Lieberman’s reasoning, in such a scenario, was supposed to be that once Netanyahu is firmly ensconced in the opposition, it would be easier for Lieberman to make his move and take over as leader of the right wing.

But what if Lieberman, a political animal with uncanny instincts, knows full well that Netanyahu is making a fatal mistake? In such a scenario, Netanyahu will lose the elections and probably leave politics, and Lieberman will be there, conveniently anointed and superbly placed, on time and exactly as planned.

I, too, don't trust Lieberman, so while the implications of this union will take time to play out and over the next days and weeks we'll learn more of how this came about, I haven't been convinced to vote for them.

The cards have yet to be fully dealt.

Talking to the wall

Attended my first flash mob event last night. It was a quickly organized rally protesting Anat Hoffman's arrest at the Kotel [The Western Wall--a retaining wall from the Second Temple built during Herod's reign] last Tuesday evening for leading the Hadassah women in reciting shma while wearing a tallit [prayer shawl].

The incident raised a lot of anger among Diaspora Jews. The USCJ [United Synagogue for Conservative Judaism] organized a global flash mob for 13:00 EDT.

Her arrest raises a number of issues for me the way Israel addresses religious pluralism, the role/place of the Kotel in Israeli/Jewish affairs and separation of religion and state (aka "Church-State" issues).

While the specific facts, details of exactly what occurred are difficult to know, it seems fair to say that:

• Anat Hoffman was wearing a tallit (against the strict understanding of the law),
• the police have been, of last, actively arresting women for wearing a tallit during the monthly Women of the Wall [WOW] prayers (they meet every Rosh Hodesh),
• Anat Hoffman and WOW are interested in 'pushing the envelope' as far as possible with women's prayer activity at the Kotel, provoking haredi sensibilities to change the "status quo",
• the Israeli police are not "the best and the brightest" among security forces and thus can act in appropriate ways,
• the police took their orders from the Rabbi of the Kotel (with the acquiescence of the political and higher up police officials) as opposed to engaging their own discretion,
• the police unnecessarily roughed up Anat Hoffman,
• the haredim [ultra-Orthodox Jews] have "captured" the effective control of the Kotel through coalition politics, their regular use of the area (as opposed to other groups who don't come every day) and playing the mythological historical card that the area was always a place of (only) strict Orthodox halakhic practice. They expect to fully dictate the rules of usage for all visitors.

Instead of the Kotel serving as a reminder of the Temple and its role of creating peace (among the nations), it's become a battle site to work out Israeli and Jewish issues surrounding the Jewish life and practice. Instead of a place to express religious feelings it's a place to exercise political power. Whatever awe the remnant of the (Second) Holy Temple evokes among its visitors, it has become an awful experience to pray there. It's a place I generally avoid visiting.

The place belongs to the entire Jewish People. As such, provisions need to be made to ensure that every Jew, regardless of their religious orientation, has a place to show their reverence for the site. Under Israeli control/administration, the plaza behind the Wall itself was expanded to accommodate almost any size group. The State [of Israel] holds its annual Remembrance Day ceremony there, the army has its induction ceremony for the Paratroopers there, and until recently many other groups held ceremonies there too.

Within the last few years, some of the plaza has been taken over by the expansion of the mehitza [divider between praying men and women]. From a place that historically had no physical divider between men and women (see pictures of the Kotel from the late 1880s and pre-1948) to a place where men and women are actively discouraged mingling by obsequious "ushers" and "rules of conduct" issued by the Rabbi of the Kotel. Religious demands have encroached upon public space.

With the haredi political parties effectively holding the balance of power in successive Israeli governments, government officials including top bureaucrats (and the Courts) have acquiesced to their (unreasonable) demands and a mostly secular public has remained generally apathetic to demanding changes to make the system less biased. The long term haredi hegemony has displaced a Zionist rabbinate/bureaucracy with a haredi one that respects less non-haredi views and behaviors.

What does this mean?

First of all, there's a growing disconnect between the "believers" and the "non-believers" and little effort or mass of people seeking to close the gap. This encourages greater alienation and disrespect of The Other. Instead of discussions where people speak WITH each other, there are arguments where people scream AT each other.

The mixing of religion and politics means that sanctity acquires a secular identity and secular issues take on religious connotations. Mudslinging becomes an activity with "holy mud" and realities and meanings lose any sense of clarity.

Coming to the Kotel and discussing its use becomes an exercise of talking to a wall. Instead of a unifying experience with other Jews and Jewish history it has become an exercise in separation and alienation. An expression of triumphalism among individuals. A zero-sum gain for all (or no one).

When I talk to the Wall, I want G-d to listen and if I speak loud enough to have others respond to my plea instead of hearing my own echo.

Elections 2013

Yesterday the Knesset approved the upcoming Israeli elections for 22 January 2013. Israel is going to the polls to--from what's the conventional media wisdom--reconfirm the current government alignment. PM Benjamin Netanyahu and the Likud party is expected to garner the most votes (and seats) with other right-wing parties following in their wake. While the actual membership of coalition remains a question, the general tenor of the government is not. Another right-of-centre government is expected to be (re)formed. Not sure if that's good news (continuity) or bad (exasperating the current problems of international isolation, Iran, the Israeli-American rift, lack of peace negotiations with the Palestinians/Arabs).

One issue requiring immediate attention is whether convicted criminals may run in the election. Specifically what about Aryeh Deri (Shas and served prison time for corruption) and Ehud Olmert (Kadima, breech of trust and currently being tried for bribery, but wasn't found to have committed moral turpitude)? Never a fan of Olmert, I believe it's in his best interest to stay out. Despite all the hype, he won't win by himself, nor  convince others to run under his banner. He's 'damaged goods' and the nostalgia,  assuming it's real, for his rule is but a mirage. Deri, on the other hand, has done his time, both in jail and waiting in the wings for his moral turpitude penalty to expire, so if he can pass the muster of the political bosses of Shas--actually it's just the BIG boss R' Ovadia Yosef--he could be on the ticket. Besides, I think most of the Knesset is filled with unconvicted crooks. At least Deri, despite his own protests, won't have to hide his true colours. I also think he can contribute to the political discourse in the Knesset and government.

Unfortunately, because of the way the elections are run, via party lists to be voted as a whole, there's little true public input or comment on individual candidates. Every member of Knesset owes their loyalty to either the party (if they have primaries) or the leader/central committee (who determines the list and rank order on it). The public is merely expected (invited may be more precise) to vote for their list. For me it makes the voting process an exercise in 'minimal damage control'--which party is the least objectionable and most benign for me (and by extension the country). Because of structural issues, the current discussion is a distraction and red herring.

What result do I want? A contactable government of only non-religious large parties who will serve for a set period to reform the electoral process--create more public (as opposed to party) accountability of MKs (members of Knesset)-- and deal with the military issues specifically (a) creating full national service for all citizens (army or civilian service) regardless of religious, national, gender or ethnic identity/affiliation and (b) the Iranian nuclear threat. Once that's done, I'd be happy to either go back to the polls under the new arrangement or even have a different coalition government formed to address the other issues (knowing that after a short time a crisis will be created to provoke a general election).

What will be get? SOS--same old sh... Maybe a party or two will change but, the coalition will be the same group of parties engaging in the same games. The "tough budget" entailing new taxes and spending cuts will not be any easier to push through--the stated reason/cause for the election--nor palpable to the general public.

The process leaves me depressed and confused. Pass me the clothes pins for my nose.

Eyes on the prize

The Jewish Daily [English] Forward had an interesting article "Occupation Divides Israeli Protest Movement: Will Efforts To Broaden Focus Lead to Marginalization?" addressing the social protest movement in Israel, which recently renewed its active protest activities from last summer.

Last summer's protest focused principally on affordable housing and lowering the cost of living (food, public transportation, etc.). Tent cities were established throughout the country and thousands--estimated at close to half a million--marched in solidarity. In response, the (national) government established a study commission (Trajeman) to address social welfare issues. With the issuance of its report and government approval, the status quo was returned.

The sense of frustration was reinforced when several other national issues come to the fore; the need to reformulate a draft policy (which currently provides either a long-term deferral or exemption to haredi men, and a total exemption of Arabs by the IDF/military), corporate/economic concentration. And, the proverbial issue of "The Palestinian Territories".

Earlier this month, thousands marched to demand the implementation of a new national service policy--haredim to serve in either (specially designed) military units or a national/civilian service program, Arabs commit to civilian service corp (within or outside their communities)--which was being 'debated' by the cabinet/government.

Others, though are trying to move the social protest movement into a different direction, grafting a call to end the (Israeli) occupation of Judea & Samaria/The West Bank (and some changes in the Gaza policy as well).

As Nir Nader, a leader of the "No Social Justice Without Ending the Occupation" protest rally said:

You can’t have social justice for just 7 million people who are Israeli citizens — you have to take everyone under Israeli rule into consideration

The issue, has served to divide more than united the social protest movement.

Some more centrist protestors are taken aback by talk of the occupation. “It seems to me like an attempt to hijack what we have here for a narrow agenda. I don’t agree with their politics and they shouldn’t bring it in,” said Jonathan Divish, a 29-year-old accounts clerk from Jerusalem, who attended the larger, draft-themed July 7 demonstration. [Idan] Miller (a leader of Common Denominator, which organized the pro-draft/national service rally) believes that the demand to withdraw unilaterally is too simplistic, “when there’s a real fear that if we withdraw from [the West Bank] we will be attacked like from Gaza.”

It's even been divisive for the left-wing political community. Dov Khenin, a representative of the far-left Hadash party and one of the most popular politicians at last year’s demonstrations, argues

[T]hat focusing on the occupation is detrimental to effecting real social change. In his view, parties in Israel lack any impetus to formulate social policies that appeal to the public, because they know that they win or lose elections based on issues related to the conflict. “Israeli governments are elected not on social and economic issues, [but] rather on the dilemma of the territories and peace, and this is why the highly capitalist policies of the last 20 years continued,” 

If the goal of the social protest movement to affect change in the Israeli society, it's imperative to keep the message simple and focused, and, actively avoid splintering the voice and demand for change. The more complicated and multifaceted the message, the easier it'll be to have the government/opinion makers drive a wedge into the movement (and its momentum) as well as moving the movement "off message." If last year's protest which were fairly cohesive produced little real change, all the more so, if the protesters engage in grape-shot this summer.

If the goal is to make socioeconomic issues a real determining factor in the next elections--currently scheduled for mid-2013--it's essential to keep it as the central focus of the protest leaders. Eyes on the prize, otherwise, you'll just be sticks in the mud.

Fire sale

Last Sunday's Haaretz [29.01] had a front page story how the upcoming State Controller's Report into the Carmel Fire of December 2010 would call for the removal of two cabinet ministers, Yuval Steinmetz (Finance) and Eli Yishai (Interior), for their failure to prevent the excess damage the fire caused. Others are cited as having some responsibility, but only these two are singled out as expected to resign their position. Supposedly, they may be transferred to a different ministry/assignment.

The article in explaining Micha Lindenstruass's (the State Controller) rationale for ministerial responsibility as:

public servants can expect personal sanctions if they break the law, act maliciously, with complete indifference, negligently or close their eyes. The greater the failure of the public servant, the greater the demand for personal responsibility

He applied this to Yishai by arguing that:

The report will apparently say that Yishai's key error was in defining the state of fire preparedness as "catastrophic" in his own words, but not considering the danger to human life as a reason to threaten to resign from the cabinet if his demands to fund the Fire and Rescue Services were not met.
Lindenstrauss also apparently deems Yishai responsible for not having money within the Interior Ministry's budget moved to the firefighting service.

And to Steinmetz:

that the finance minister exceeded his authority and contravened cabinet decisions by preventing funding from reaching the Fire and Rescue Services by conditioning that funding on service reforms.

Let me see, he claims that the Finance Minister in demanding service reforms in an effort to ensure a more efficient and effective fire fighting service was negligent? That the Interior Minister didn't transfer adequate funds also acted irresponsibly?

It's true that the disaster was preventable. The Fire and Rescue Services could have been better funded.There could have, should have, been better communication and coordination between the various public safety bodies. However, all the mistakes were neither created nor enacted on the current government's watch. It was the result of long-term planning (sic.) of previous governments and the general civil service cultural battles.

Luckily, the comptroller's critique of elected officials, as opposed to public servants (bureaucrats), is not legally binding. His suggestion is a ludicrous one.

It has generated media coverage. Hopefully, that will prevent another disaster. It shouldn't come by having some officials fall on the sword needlessly. That suggestion misses the point of the review.