Electoral reform - take 1

Today's Haartez has two articles about electoral reform in Israel emanating from the inconclusive results of this week's election.

Both suggest that the path will be a difficult one.

Shahar Ilan in his article “Major reforms are unlikely, but electoral thresholds could be raised” suggest that only minor changes will happen if only because it's unclear what people want and small parties--some of whom may be part of the next government--are against tinkering with a system that gets them elected and part of the government (cabinet/coalition).

Menachem Ben Sasson, the recent chair of the Knesset's Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, and a former Rector of Hebrew University in his op-ed piece "Why we have failed to change the system" lays out what he sees as the goal of the process and why it didn't happen during the last Knesset.

If that is a true reflection of the public's mood to place the issue on the agenda of the next Knesset, then great. If it's just a elite sentiment or a momentary fit of venting to the results of the recent elections, reform is doomed to failure.

For me, the election hasn't made the issue any more acute than before the election. The fact that two parties won near identical number of seats and there's no clear 'winner' in terms of who's the natural person to be asked first to form the government. The fact that Kadima/Tzippi Livni won the largest number of seats suggests, if only to me, that the public doesn't want Likud/Netanyahu to be the government. On the other hand, the fact that right-wing parties have a clear majority of the Knesset seats, suggests that people want a nationalist/right-wing government which Likud is better suited for than Kadima. It's also fair to say that the country has drifted to the right--the need to take a harder line vis-a-vis the Palestinian issues. That would explain the demise of the Jewish left-wing parties, especially Meretz in the election. (Labour was also affected, but their demise may be a result of other more long-term and complicated reasons including the revolving door leadership.)

Menachem Ben Sasson lays out what he views as the goals of electoral reform. In terms of the goals, he writes:

...reduce coalition parties' ability to threaten stability include increasing (from 61 today) the number of Knesset members needed to propose a replacement prime minister; a law that grants the head of the largest Knesset faction the first right to try to form a coalition (which will encourage voters to choose large parties); and a return of the cap on the number of ministers to 18.

In response, he suggests:

This goal can also be brought closer by raising the percentage of the overall vote needed for a party to enter the Knesset. It can be furthered by the so-called Norwegian law, which would require all ministers and deputy ministers except party chiefs to resign from the Knesset and be replaced by the next person on their party's
list. There would also be an amendment to the way the budget is passed and supervised when carried out. Elected officials' commitment to the public would be strengthened by a new Elections Law in which half the MKs would be elected in local balloting.

Then he asks

If the problems are so grave and the way toward a solution is clear, where have we, the elected officials, been for the past three years?

Very soon after the establishment of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee in the outgoing Knesset, the coalition parties and most other Knesset factions embarked on a move to bring about the legislation discussed above. Thirty-eight meetings in 2007 were devoted to drafting bills to be voted on in the committee. But just when the work was prepared for the vote, some committee members (from the coalition as well) pulled out. The draft laws are languishing in the committee stage.

Just as the vote was coming up, Shas, who had until then strongly supported the bill (in increase the voter threshold) withdrew its support, supposedly due to pressure from the other smaller religious party.

These parties later hinted that if they did not win the required percentage they would join up with Shas, along with their rabbinical establishments, threatening Shas' rabbinical establishment. Shas' leaders explained their change of position on the "head of the largest faction" law by saying that their voters, who hold right-wing positions, would vote for Likud because of concerns that the head of a less-hawkish party might become prime minister. The way Shas conducted itself in the last election (the "distant-relatives" tango between Shas and Likud) indicates that their
concerns were sincere.

It's ironic how Shas was manipulated by the other haredi parties in the same way they have, in past, sought to extort concessions from the party seeking their support to join the coalition.

In terms of the goals of the process

• I agree that the government need to be made more stable and members of Knesset more accountable to the public and not just to their party members/ leadership.
• Raising the necessary threshold for election to the Knesset as well as dissolving the government more difficult and creating a form of direct elections for Knesset members makes sense. For the former, I hope it will "encourage" (force or dissuade) smaller parties to merge as a larger bloc and individuals to avoid turning small--often personal--slights or policy differences into a 'cult of personality' by creating their own party. Better, allowing for active intra-party factions.
• Having half the Knesset elected directly by a region/riding, will (hopefully) create an atmosphere of true accountability to the public (electorate) instead of the party apparatchiks who created the party list for public consideration/election.
• Enacting a law that the leader of the largest faction automatically is invited to form a government will cause people to vote for the bigger parties to be suspect. While, people should be encouraged to vote for a large party, I'm not sure having only a small number of large parties is either desirable (on the theoretical level) or workable in Israel (practicable). Israel continues to be a country full of divergent voices, divided not only on political lines--right vs left, free market vs socialist/protective, peace vs hard-line, pro vs anti settlements--but also on ethnic and national--Jew, Arab (Muslim, Christian, Druze, Bedouin)--and religious outlook--observant vs secular (and everyone--the majority--who define themselves as traditional and not in either extremist camp). Many groups deserve a voice in the Knesset, though not the 'right' to have their minority agenda foisted upon the majority population.
• Even worse, is his suggestion of enacting the "Norwegian law". What Israel needs is a more publicly accountable government. Ministers need to be directly accountable to the public and its legislative body. Having the cabinet not be members of the Knesset seems backwards to me. Unless and until there's a true presidential electoral system/framework, either like France or the US, cabinet members and the PM MUST be a member of the legislature [the Knesset].

The road will be a long one. Hopefully, the larger parties, either those elected to the largest number of seats (Kadima[28], Likud[27] and Yisrael Beitanu[15] = 70 seats) or the traditional large parties (Kadima, Likud and Labour[13] = 68), will put aside their egos and agree to form a national unity government for a specific period whose primary goal will be enacting electoral reform. It will "kill two birds with one stone"; (a) they'll be a stable government for a set period and no elections and (b) will keep the smaller parties out of the coalition so the best interests of the country (larger parties and more stable governments) can be considered and enacted.

While both options present a majority government, I'm not sure either will happen. Too much vested interests and ego involved to do the rational thing. Too bad.