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After 1,941 days—over five years—in captivity, Gilad Shalit returned home to Israel today. In exchange for releasing him, Hamas negotiated the release of 1,027 jailed Palestinian (and Israeli-Arab) terrorists. While there's great joy for the Shalit family, the agreement also elicited a barrage of criticism. From bereaved families of terror victims who were killed in attacks planned, ordered and/or perpetrated by some of those freed in the deal (who petitioned the High Court of Justice to stop the deal), right-wing politicians (and their supporters) who “on principal” are against freeing convicted terrorists especially those with “blood on their hands” and those who see themselves as critics of the government and its component parts. In the end, despite the complaints, Gilad is free and home with his family and free to get his life back in order.

For me, it’s a mixed blessing. On the one hand, I’m ecstatic that he’s free and seemingly in good health—at least physically and I hope also mentally/emotionally. On the other hand, a lot of questions continue to nag me. Questions principally about the price Israel paid and the entire process of redeeming him from captivity,

1.      How did Israel allow him to get kidnapped?

2.      Why it took so long to finalize a deal?

3.      How come no rescue attempt was made?

4.      The role of public opinion and the media in “forcing the government’s hand” to make a deal.

5.      Was this a matter of placing personal concerns above the “national interest”?

6.      Its effect on the peace process.

7.      Its effect on international affairs; the Middle East in general and with Egypt, Hamas [Gaza], the PLO/Palestinian Authority [West Bank and Mahmud Abbas], the Arab world specifically, as well as other interested actors (the Quartet), the UN, and human rights groups.

8.      Is this good for Israel, both in for the short and long-term, especially with regard to deterring further kidnappings and violence?

According to Amos Harel, the abduction was planned in advance.

The terrorists captured Shalit by crossing the border from the Gaza Strip before sunrise through a tunnel hundreds of meters long. The tunnel had been dug under the border fence over the course of months. When the terrorists surfaced in Israeli territory, they came up behind the IDF troops, who were facing Gaza … At 5:13 A.M., three separate groups of terrorists attacked Shalit’s tank and a guard tower, along with an empty armored personnel carrier the IDF had placed there as a decoy. All three targets were hit by antitank fire. Shalit’s tank went up in flames, triggering a fire extinguisher. … Within six minutes of the assault, two terrorists had returned to Gaza with the wounded Shalit. IDF officers recall the period that followed as chaotic, noting that it took time before they realized a soldier was missing.

Here’s the first kicker:

The incident occurred less than a year after Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip. To some extent, the country was paying the price for repressing concern over the security situation in Gaza. Because the government considered it important to present the disengagement from Gaza as an accomplishment, the dangers posed by the new situation were played down. The defensive deployment around Gaza was only partial, and the IDF was not allowed to enter the strip to foil terrorist attacks.

The second kicker:

At his briefing after Shalit’s abduction, Halutz [the IDF Chief of Staff at the time] told reporters the IDF had no advance warning of an attack. This enraged Yuval Diskin, then head of the Shin Bet security service. In fact, the Shin Bet had given the army detailed, specific information about an expected attack. Based on this warning, the army had increased its troop levels somewhat along a 14-kilometer stretch of the border. But Halutz’s lie was quickly exposed when reporters interviewed the wounded member of Shalit’s tank crew: He confirmed that the sector had been on alert for a possible abduction.

The third kicker:

Ultimately, none of the senior officers involved paid the price of the debacle. Maj. Gen. Yoav Galant, who was GOC Southern Command at the time, was later nominated as IDF chief of staff, though his nomination was later withdrawn for unrelated reasons. Aviv Kochavi, then commander of the Gaza division, now heads Military Intelligence.

The fourth:

A subsequent investigation found that another tank commander actually saw the terrorists crossing back into Gaza with Shalit, but did not open fire because he was awaiting permission. In retrospect, this might have foiled the abduction, but it could also have resulted in Shalit’s death.

The prescient comment:

The day after the abduction, a defense official well-versed in hostage negotiations advised then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to close a deal immediately. “Give Hamas 250 people and it will be over,” he said. “Otherwise, it will take you three years and cost you 1,000 prisoners.”

Instead, Olmert opted to exploit the kidnapping to try to crush Hamas.

Five and half years later, the defense official appears correct.