The Mourning after ...

The dust is beginning to settle on the Gaza war between Israel and Hamas. The ceasefire is generally holding -- Israel has claimed to have completely removed its soldiers (though many are still deployed along the border just in case), there's only sporadic firing on Israel, outsiders including media and international observers (e.g. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon) are coming for "visits"-- so the focus is now on dissecting its results and creating a new future.

The New York Times has dedicated a "room for debate" blog thread to the issue. The Globe & Mail (Canada) reports how angry the UN Secretary-General is following his tour of the damage. CNN has sent its reporter Ben Wedeman to survey the damage and speak to the people. Few in the world has a kind thing to say about Israel or a critical comment about Hamas' behavior in using human shields or use of neutral sites (a UNWRA school, hospitals or residential neighborhoods) to fire upon Israeli military and civilian (over the border) targets. Oh, well...

Was this inevitable? Hamas by merely surviving the Israeli onslaught and not folding won the war? That Israel, whatever, the legitimate causes for going to war was the loser?

To better evaluate the results, it would be interesting to see what was written before or early in the war.

The International Crisis Group published a briefing "Ending the War in Gaza", Middle East Briefing No. 26, 5 January 2009 (pdf). In it, they evaluate the three major players in the conflict--Hamas, the Palestinian Authority (Fatah and Mahmud Abbas) in "the West Bank"and Israel -- and their interests and prospects in engaging in war/conflict.

They write:

1.Hamas

Hamas might not have wished for a full-scale confrontation. There are indications it believed its brinkmanship would force Egypt to mediate a new ceasefire agreement entailing opening of the crossings and persuade Israel to accept it. Three days after the ceasefire’s expiration, a Hamas leader in Gaza said, “there is a previous agreement on the truce with conditions that have not
been met by Israel..." ... The Islamist movement arguably wagered that a steady stream of rockets could force that outcome at minimal cost to itself. But if all-out war was not intended, it was deemed an alternative preferable to the status quo. Hamas leaders made clear that perpetuation of the existing situation was tantamount to renewal of a one-sided ceasefire ... “our strategy is to end the siege using all means”.

[A]s Hamas leaders plainly saw it, a confrontation carried potential benefits. Speaking in the wake of Israel’s attack, a Hamas spokesperson in Lebanon said:

We didn’t really have a choice. It was either die slowly because of the blockade or more quickly due to confrontation. Israel was telling us, “accept the blockade that is killing you”. Despite all the suffering, this aggression put an end to a more painful situation. Now, the whole world is seeing that Palestinians are being killed. Before, people would die and no one would take note.

For Hamas, they were not only fighting Israel but also Egypt--for keeping the Rafah crossing closed--and the Palestinian Authroity in the West Bank.

Israel is not the only party blamed. While anger toward Israel was predictable, outrage at Egypt and the PA does not lag far behind. A Hamas supporter said, "Abbas and [Egyptian President Hosni] Mubarak are using civilians in Gaza to
teach Hamas a lesson”. At Gaza City’s Shifa hospital, victims’ families curse Abbas and Mubarak with no less vehemence than they do Israel; a woman crying over her two children – one dead, one brain-damaged – accused them of “killing innocent people in Gaza to teach Hamas a lesson”. None of this should be viewed as necessarily translating into support for Hamas; many still resent the movement for its failures in government, its bloody takeover and repressive means. Another grieving woman, who also had lost children, cried that she hoped that “God will exterminate Hamas”. But, in many quarters, the intensity of Israel’s attacks, the feeling of betrayal at the hands of Egypt as well as the PA and Hamas’s steadfastness for now are playing into the Islamic movement’s hands.In the end,Should Hamas nonetheless be in a position where it no longer can effectively rule Gaza – a situation Israel might create intentionally or unwittingly – a movement leader claims it will simply go nderground and “revert to its original state as a resistance movement”. During the Egyptian
reconciliation drive and again in the wake of the ceasefire [the six month one which was in effect until shortly before the war], senior Hamas leaders repeatedly emphasised that preserving the movement was more important than preserving the Gaza government.

2. The Palestinian Authority/West Bank

The Palestinian Authority and Fatah are not involved in the current Israeli-Hamas confrontation and yet – or as a result – they (especially the former) currently are emerging as among its more notable losers. Abbas in particular is in a delicate spot, unable either to play a significant role or
find the right words.

In the end,

The final impact of events in Gaza on the West Bank remains unclear. What is less uncertain is the toll it is taking on the PA leadership’s fortunes. Mustafa Barghouti, a former presidential candidate and head of the Palestinian National Initiative, put it characteristically bluntly:

The current crisis demonstrates to many that Abbas is incapable of representing or protecting his people. If he has good relations with the U.S., why can’t he stop an assault on his own people? If he doesn’t have good relations with the U.S., then what has he been doing the last four years? Good relations with the U.S. was his whole program. Likewise, if negotiations with Israel are not working, he should resign; if negotiations are working, why is Israel doing this to Gaza?

3. Israel

Israel, too, was dissatisfied with the ceasefire, especially as it applied to returning Gilad Shalit and opening of the border crossings (for aid). Nonetheless, they did hope that the ceasefire would somehow be renewed, Israel--though Defence Minister Ehud Barak--held its fire despite the massive increase in rocket fire immediately following the cessation of the ceasefire.

At the core though, was their need

not to give in to Hamas’s insistence that they be opened.

For Israel, it was important to persuade not only Hamas but others in the region that the Islamist movement could not extract concessions through violence ...

Additionally, though in the background, the upcoming Israeli elections on 10 Feb, also informed the planning process and response. Barak needed to present himself as THE military leader different from Amir Peretz and a positive model following the debacle of the 2nd Lebanon War with Hizbollah (2006). Each party needed to ensure that going to war won't backfire on them.

“Going to war in an election period is not a wise move. One knows how to get into a war but not how to get out. The whole thing can turn upside down very easily. Barak simply felt he has to do it, and do it now, in order to achieve the main goal – stopping the fire on Sderot and the south”. Regardless of the electoral season, virtually any Israeli government would have felt compelled to react.

[Yet] ... reluctant to act, Barak went all-out once the decision was made. The initial bombardment from air and sea elicited widespread satisfaction in military circles. It targeted the locations of Hamas’s rule over Gaza: police stations on the first day, killing over 200 Palestinians, the highest recorded number in a single day in the occupied Palestinian territories since 1967; the tunnel supply lines on the second; and homes of Hamas leaders and government buildings on subsequent ones. ...

A key lesson Barak drew from the 2006 Lebanon War is the crucial importance
of who is seen as victor and who as loser. He believes Israel’s power of deterrence decreased in the Second Lebanon War. He will, therefore, not allow this campaign not to reach its objectives or to end with the appearance of an Israeli defeat ...

With time, earlier reported differences between security officials seeking a prompt exit strategy and politicians aspiring to reshape the political map appear to have considerably narrowed. The emerging consensus centres on an air and land campaign aimed not only at ending rocket fire but also at destroying or at least seriously impairing Hamas’s long-range rocket capabilities, security apparatus and longer-term threat potential, halting or seriously reducing weapons smuggling and barring any Hamas activity within a perimeter of several hundred metres from Israeli borders.

The options confronting Israel are multiple. The question is how much damage can be inflicted upon Hamas and its leadership which would temper its terrorist behavior while not creating a real power vacuum that no one of real stature can fill? How can it avoid getting itself stuck in an occuation mode? Does it have the wherewithal to strike quickly and effectively and then get itself out of ythe Gaza morass to the "applause of the world community"?

In terms of press coverage, it hasn't been good. Even American TV, Meet the Press (4 January), was highly critical of the Israeli actions--be it its limiting access to foreign press, its attacks responding to Hamas fire upon "innocent civilians" (though it's difficult to ascertain/verify whose a dressed up Hamas fighter and who's the innocent bystander).

Unilateral ceasefire

A few minutes ago, the "two Ehuds" PM Olmert and Defense Minister Barak announced that with the receipt of a letter from several European leaders -- France (Sarkozy), Germany (Merkel), Great Britain (Brown) and Italy (Berisconi)-- agreeing to assist Egypt in preventing Hamas was rearming via its tunnel system, Israel has announced it will unilaterally commence a ceasefire as of early this morning at 2:00 am (Israel time).

While on one hand, I'm pleased that hostilities are over--assuming Hamas ceases to fire rockets into Israel (which it did shortly before the official announcement was made)-- and that the political process can begin to create a new reality on the ground, on the other hand, I strongly wonder if (a) it'll work, (b) it wasn't caving in to international pressure (from the international community including the personal entreaties of the UN Secretary General) and the negative world media and (c) if all (or even most) of the goals were achieved.

At the end of the day, Gilad Shalit is still in captivity. Hamas still has the wherewithal to fire rockets into Israel beyond the Gaza border region. Israel will be vilified for damaging Gaza and the large number of civilian causalities.

It was a no-win situation and now with Hamas' ability to spin its situation and Fatah/Abbas/ Palestinian Authority to exercise any real authority I'm not convinced Israel achieved a Pyrrhic victory.

We'll see and more to come later as the dust truly settles.

Strip search

A strip-search is generally understood to mean:

TRANSITIVE VERB: To search (a person) for illegal articles, such as drugs or weapons, by first requiring the removal of all clothing (The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language: Fourth Edition. 2000)

In addition to playing with the word "strip" (with the Gaza STRIP), the situation in the Gaza strip suggest that the verb and its metaphor are appropriate here.

1. The IDF is currently engaged in its ground attack in search for weapons and other terrorist equipment and activities, and


2. The world sees it as acceptable to 'dress-down' Israel for its behavior in running its military campaign.

It seems clear that Hamas has spent much of its existence as the ruling authority in Gaza promoting at best and organizing the smuggling of arms through underground tunnels from Egypt into the Gaza Strip via the "Philadelphia Corridor". For one reason or another, the smuggling has continued unabated under the watchful [sic.] eye of the Egyptians and the consternation of Israel. That many of the tunnels run under homes and end also in the basements of residences (of either Hamas leaders or civilian sympathizers) make their discovery difficult and their eradication complicated (if only to avoid additional civilian injury or death).

So while some tunnels may be located and destroyed by air, many require a house-to-house search for them. Hence, a strip search at great personal risk to the ground soldiers.

The ground forces are also focused on "neutralizing the threat" by locating and destroying the mobile rocket launchers (removing the threat), finding caches of weapons and munition, arresting/killing the military leadership (and its structure), and (I assume) also proactively (i) locating and rescuing Gilad Shalit and (ii) convincing Hamas to either abdicate its rule, change its ideological commitment to Israel's destruction by recognizing Israel's right to exist or join its West Bank 'brothers' in negotiating a political settlement so a two state solution may be reached. In other words, lessen (preferably remove) the threat of rockets and anti-Israel terrorist activities emanating from Gaza.

The literal sense is stifled by the more figurative understanding of the strip-search, in this case directed AT Israel instead directed by Israel.

The media and world opinion (encompassing both ordinary public opinion and government pronouncements) has been unanimously critical of Israel. While some may acknowledge Israel's suffering under Hamas rocket attacks it is tempered by their critique of Israel's 'over reaction' and 'disproportionate response.' One exception to this trend was Ian O'Doherty "Why the Israeli people have had enough" in the Irish Independent newspaper. Otherwise, it seems to be open season for attacking Israel:

• CNN seems to never miss an opportunity to announce that Israel refuses to allow its reporters to enter Gaza and must, therefore, report from the Gaza-Israel border.
• The BBC gives the microphone to Gazans (somehow, they managed to get their press team(s) into Gaza itself) how Israel is wantonly attacking--killing and injuring--'innocent' civilians.
• The printed media, including The New York Times and the Washington Post (see especially their talk back sections), highlight the Gaza attacks while downplaying the last eight years and current bombing by Hamas upon (southern) Israel.

Somehow, Israel is to have its clothing removed as its reasons for going to war questioned while Gaza is presented as (again) the victim of "disproportionate" response, "naked" aggression by Israel. In the end, the "naked truth" is left wanting as little or no context to the conflict is given.

Unresolved counsel

Last Thursday's (8 Jan 2009) attempt to craft a ceasefire agreement by the UN Security Council has fallen flat through its resolution on the situation on Gaza -- SC Resolution 1860 (2009). Despite working to create the language of the resolution, the US abstained while the other 14 country members voted in favor.

In the words of the UN Press Release:

Explaining her abstention, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the US wanted to see the outcome of the Egyptian initiative first, but allowed the resolution to go forward because it was a step in the right direction. A negative vote by the US, one of the Council’s permanent members with veto powers, would have killed the measure.

Stressing the urgency of “an immediate, durable and fully respected ceasefire,” and calling for “the unimpeded provision and distribution throughout Gaza of humanitarian assistance,” it called on UN Member States to support international efforts to alleviate the humanitarian and economic situation in Gaza, including through additional contributions to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

It also called on Member States “to intensify efforts to provide arrangements and guarantees in Gaza in order to sustain a durable ceasefire and calm, including to prevent illicit trafficking in arms and ammunition and to ensure the sustained re-opening of crossing points.” Israel has accused Hamas of smuggling more advanced rockets and weapons and has closed crossings into Gaza in response to Hamas rocket fire.

The US rationale is a lame excuse and seems to have made the resolution DOA. With its veto power, it could have just as easily called for, by either politely requesting or threatening a veto to delay the vote to wait for the results of Egyptian initiative. Their behavior in addition to showing the ineptness of the Bush foreign policy (and Sec. Rice) also opened the door for both sides to ignore the call.

According to the Barak Ravid in Sunday's Haartez [11 Jan 2009], Israel was disappointed with the lack of support it received form its 'allies.'

• France (President Nicolas Sarkozy) broke its promise to prevent the proposal from being finalized, if Israel agreed to a joint French-Egyptian ceasefire proposal.
• The US (President George Bush) refusal to veto.
• The failure to incorporate the release of Gilad Shalit (the abducted IDF soldier) from its captors in Gaza.

Aluf Benn in a front page story in Sunday's Haartez labeled the UN Resolution as "a serious diplomatic malfunction" for Israel and its struggle for having its concerns addressed.

[E]ven if the decision bears no operative significance, it should stir
concerns in Israel for three reasons.

First, things are not going to get better. This is the international position, which identifies with the Palestinian suffering and ignores Gilad Shalit's fate and the suffering of the people in Israel's south.

Second, although Hamas is not mentioned in the resolution - which it has rejected - ... their friends have good reason to smile. Hamas' Gaza regime now enjoys the legitimacy afforded it by the Security Council, the international community's highest institution. That's because Resolution 1680 refers to a Hamas republic as a fait accompli. The resolution does not demand that the Strip be returned to the Palestinian Authority, except in the call for a renewed settlement for the crossings, which will be based on the old agreement between Israel and the PA. Nor does the resolution call for disarming the militias and terrorist groups operating in the Gaza Strip.

Third, the process that led to the passing of the resolution points to Jerusalem's failure in handling the issue. Israel objected to having the war end in a Security Council resolution similar to the one that ended the Second Lebanon War. This is probably why Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni - who led those who oppose an agreement for fear it might legitimize Hamas - opted to stay at home instead of heading over to the UN headquarters in New York.

In the battle for public opinion, Israel is failing. Despite the lack of real Arab support for Hamas, there's wide support for the plight of the Palestinian Gazans and disgust for the Israeli military response -- in the media, Arab masses and governments -- as witnessed as the ongoing anti-Israeli protests throughout the globe. Israel has failed to ensure that its message is given mass support. So while, Israelis may still support the need for war, there's a clear realization that time is quickly running out to continue the war and ensure its goals of significantly reducing the Hamas bombing and terrorist capabilities are achieved.

To reinforce the ambiguous situation, I'll close with two voices from leading UN officers.

From Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in remarks to the Security Council following the adaption of the resolution said:

An immediate and durable ceasefire is the first step. However, we also all know that more will be needed, and that a political way forward is required to deliver long-term security and peace.

Earlier, the General Assembly President Miguel D’Escoto chided the lack of action by the Security Council.

“I can’t stand the smell of formaldehyde,” he told a news briefing at Headquarters. “Rigor mortis seems to have taken over, and we are failing the world, we are failing the cause of peace,” he added, referring to “the dysfunctionality” of the Council.

They both may be correct. However, until the international community ceases to perpetuate its "business as usual" approach--pity on the Palestinians (and the terrorist Hamas) and shame on Israel for responding militarily to provocation--and honestly (in good faith and evenhandedness) lays the groundwork for creating infrastructure for a political solution, the the wheels for peace instead of inching forward will be left spinning in the mud a process sullied by the slinging mud (which could be better being used to build "peace cabins").

War is a humanitarian crisis

The Israeli incursion into Gaza is now 11 days old and the world press continues to harp upon the humanitarian crisis for the Gaza residents. This is despite the regular, albeit limited (around 80), trucks delivering humanitarian aid via Israel. Lost in the discussion are: (a) the refusal of Egypt (their neighbor and fellow Arab) to open its border at Rafah for Arab/Islamic aid to enter and wounded to exit to receive necessary medical attention--the border is sealed shut to prevent a mass exit of fleeing refugees, (b) Hamas has purposefully placed its military strategic posts near very more densely populated civilian or religious sites (e.g. mosques) so as to garner better propaganda points. No one seems to address the issue that Hamas has placed its civilian population in a military crisis its entire existence as the governing body of Gaza.

• It staged a bloody coup to wrest control of Gaza from the Palestinian Authority (viz Fatah) and has kept the population especially Fatah leaders, members and sympathizers under control;
• It has refused to change its raison d'etre to at least accommodate the existence of the State of Israel (aka "the evil Zionist entity"), if only as a facade to end the diplomatic siege/ boycott of Hamas by the international community;
• It has lobbed--complicitly or directly--rockets and bombs into southern Israel since the beginning of its control, thereby terrorizing Israelis and 'inviting' (dare I say taunting?) Israel to respond with military force and perpetuating the Israeli blockade of its crossings between Israel and Gaza.

Hamas created the humanitarian crisis and with international complicity (media and other 'well-meaning' international organizations) perpetuated it. Instead of working to reverse it and accept responsibility for improving the conditions for its people, it exacerbated the situation and blames Israel for all its problems.

The call for a cease-fire by many, the UN, the European Union as well as by the Arab/Islamic world is both an enabling device for the Hamas to divert attention from its own responsibility to protect its people from violence as well as another opportunity to prevent Israel from protecting itself from senseless provocation and terrorism. Unfortunately, Israel is caught begtween being an upstanding member of the international community and doing what it feels is needed to stop the bullying. Instead of waiting to hear from Hamas about its intentions about abiding by a ceasefire, it offers its response first. Instead of demanding Galit Shalit back first, it transmits funds to Hamas [Israel nismanagement of Dec 2008] and provides a list of prisoners (read Hamas terrorists) it's willing to release.

Let's place the conflict in context and have both sides feet put to the fire, instead of using the situation as (yet) another opportunity to bash Israel and its right to exist in peace and dignity.

The fog of war

Beyond the usual 'fog of war' the confusion and lack of real time and accurate information about is actually occurring in the battles, the Israel-Palestinian/Arab conflict seems to add an additional sheet of fog.

People view the conflict through a specific ideological lens (=fog). Few, if any, seem able or willing to approach the issue 'objectively' evaluating the situation without preconditions or assumptions. All too often, there are knee jerk reactions especially as it relates to Israel's actions. People's "minds are already made up, they don't want to become confused with the 'facts'".

Protests seem de rigour in the Arab countries. Sponsored (encouraged at minimum) by the government to publicly demonstrate their support of the Palestinian cause (without having to do anything concrete like financially support their [the Palestinian] economy and social needs). I get the sense that Israel seems a convenient whipping post to deflect criticism of the regime and a way to promote their call (not generally considered politically correct) for the destruction of the State of Israel.

Israel--post 1967--no longer is seen as a victim of Arab/Palestinian aggression. That Israelis suffer under constant bombings or terrorist attacks (like suicide bombings) with minimal (less than 100's of deaths) seems unworthy of comment. On the contrary, it's the result of their [Israel] "occupation" of Gaza (which it officially--de jure and de facto--disengaged its presence) and the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and the building of settlements. For me, the left (including some in Israel), the non-aligned countries and the Islamic world have joined forces to protest each and every Israeli action.

That Egypt has 'failed' to fall into lock step with the other Arab countries, has made it a target for tremendous criticism -- betraying the Arab cause and engaging in "treason". There's no such thing as an honest broker, it's either "us" or "them" (a la the George W Bush world view).

How to cut through the fog?

First, we must recognized its complexity and lack of a simple solution. Benny Morris' op-ed piece in the New York Times on 30 Dec 2008 is a start.

Next, biases must be disclosed (if that's actually possible).

Equity without moral equivalences must be the rule. Both sides need to have their feet put to the fire. The comments of the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon yesterday (29.Dec.2008) is a start.

“While recognizing Israel’s security concerns regarding the continued firing of rockets from Gaza, he firmly reiterates Israel’s obligation to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law and condemns excessive use of force leading to the killing and injuring of civilians, ... condemns the ongoing rocket attacks by Palestinian militants and is deeply distressed that repeated calls on Hamas for these attacks to end have gone unheeded"

As was his statement of 24.Dec.2006 calling on Hamas to cease its rocket attacks on Israel.

“The Secretary-General is gravely concerned about the situation in Gaza and southern Israel and the potential for further violence and civilian suffering if calm is not restored,” a statement issued by his spokesperson said. “He condemns today's rocket attacks on southern Israel.”

What influence this will have on UN deliberations--in the General Assembly and especially within the Security Council--is anyone's guess.

In the meantime, some fog lights are being shined on the issue. Hopefully, it'll start to cut through the ideological fog too.

Return Fire

This morning Israel launched a military response to the years of Hamas (Palestinian) rocket attacks which were recently intensified upon the residents of southern Israel (cross to the Gaza border). It was a long time in coming and hopefully will be short lived in duration.

I do have several questions about this military operation:

1. What's the goal -- destroy the Hamas infrastructure and its governance of Gaza, (forcing the) returning Gilad Shalit, creating a demilitarized zone in Gaza, securing a period of quiet for previously shelled southern Israeli communities ...?
2. Is this a one time event or the start of a regular/occasional pattern of incursions in Gaza to quiet down the terrorist activities/rocket attacks?
3. How will international reaction (condemnation) be addressed?
4. How will the international PR/"propaganda" campaign be implemented, particularly in counteracting the Hamas/Arab propaganda campaign, especially when Israel bombs a heavily populated civilian site.
5. How will civilian casualties ("collateral damage") be minimized?

How much of this situation is attributable to the withdrawal from Gaza Ariel Sharon pushed through three summers ago? While the idea was a good one--Israel/Jews were settled in a massive Arab/Palestinian area (that not even the Egypt wanted to have despite its 'occupation' from 1948 - 1967)--it was poorly executed. Rather than being a planful event, ensure that the displaced residents had a place to go to easily start its life over, negotiate a real understanding with the Palestinian Authority that the vacated structures would be used for good instead of being thoughtlessly and wantonly vandalized/destroyed and that the border with southern Israel would remain quiet.

• Three years on, the evacuees remain destitute and there is no quiet or comfort along the southern border with Gaza.
• Gilad Shalit remains a prisoner of Hamas (though not necessarily the same faction that's governing Gaza).
• The people of Sderot and the surrounding kibbutzim and other communities including those further north can expect more rocket attacks in the coming days in response to Israel's incursion/operation against Hamas.

Will the cycle of violence end or is this yet another nail in the coffin?