Voting for its own sake

Today is Election Day in Israel. After 100 days of campaigning, I'm still not excited about the elections or the choices offered. I will enter the voting booth, plug my nose and put in a voting slip for the least worst of the available options.

The first difficulty is that there's no real leader in the bunch. No one worthy of being the Prime Minister. If the polls are accurate, Benjamin Netanyahu will continue his reign. While he has managed to keep the coalition in order for the last four years, he has shown little leadership skills other than doing whatever was necessary to remain in power. He seems more an empty vessel--vacillating between different voices/demands--rather than setting out and then fulfilling his vision. Instead of taking clear stands, like between the Ehud Barak and Gadi Ashkenazi (Army Chief of Staff), he let the issue of their disagreement(s) fester until it spilled over into the subject of numerous news reports (when Ashkenazi was being replaced after his term) and the Controller report on the "Harpaz Affair." If he had steped in toward the beginning, maybe it won't have blown up into a significant affair.

The other party leaders are even worse. Tzipi Livni had her shot at the can as PM and Opposition Leader, during which she was underwhelming. Shelly Yachamovitch is also seen an inappropriate. Yair Lapid has no parliamnetary experience and may be more smoke and mirrors than real substance.

Then there are the multiple parties competing for seats. Likud Beitanu (a merger of convenience for this election) will certainly garner the most seats, somewhere around 35, but is expected to unravel immediately following the elections if Avigidor Leiberman (head of Israel Beitanu) is to be believed. This is less than the combined 42 seats they had in the previous Knesset. Where has their support gone?

Most pundits are saying that Bayit HaYehudi (the former NRP) which in the last election had 3 seats is projected to win 14 seats due to the charisma of its new leader Naftali Bennett will be the main benefiary of the decline in the Likud-Israel Beitanu support. Bennett while portrayed as a successful high tech businessperson (who sold his company for $145 million), elite soldier and right-wing functionary as the chief of staff for Netanyahu (as Opposition Leader) and executive of the settlers organization, both of which he left under a cloud has moved the religious-Zionist party/community to the extreme right on security issues. The other Jewish parties to his right may not pass the vote threshold to win seats.

Shas, which "welcomed back" Aryeh Deri to its leadership (after an enforced absence from formal politics becuase of a crimonal sentence) is no better. They along with the other haredi parties will receive about 20 seats between them--Shas 14 and Agudat Israel/Degel Torah 5--have been part of the problem of governong Israel. In exchange for their entry into the government, monies have been siphoned off to fund their "projects" (subsidies for their yeshiva students and educational systems) and their demands have prevented creating a more equitable Israel especially regarding national service/army but also, by extension, providing more affordable housing for the non-haredi populations. Then there's the issue surrounding the "Jewish character" of the state. Who's a Jew, conversion of (especially) Israelis from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, and event the issue of African refugees have been poisoned by their presence in the government.

The two groups above are seen as the natural partners for Netanyahu. There's a question about whether Bibi wants to go in that direction, ensuring the status quo , which people aren't excited about and supposedly the reason why the election was called in the first place because they weren't willing to pass the necessary austerity budget that will be passed by the new Knesset. Go figure.

Other potential partners consist of two new center-left parties--Tzipi Livni's hastly constructed "Teneua" and Yair Lapid's "Yesh Atid"--whose lists are cobbled together with generally excellent people but share little of a common denominator other than deciding to join and run on a specific list. I view this two parties as ego driven to implode shortly--a couple of years from today. Neither has specifically announced that won't join the coalition. In the case of Lapid, he has made it conditional upon not sitting with the haredi parties. While that's certainly commendable and i also agree haredim shouldn't be in the next government, he and his "gang" are complete neophytes in the Knesset. In the case of Livni, she has a number of "castoffs" from Kadima and even Amir Peretz (who was #3 for Labor before bolting) and other fine people. But why she won't agree to join another party is beyond me. I see it as an ego thing.

That leaves two other (Jewish) parties definitely being in the Knesset--Labor and Meretz. Since I don't define myself as left-wing, I need to discount Meretz. With a clothespin on my nose, I support Labor.

There are a few other parties who are expected also be in the Knesset, mostly Arab.

Then there are a few parties on the bubble, Kadima (down from 28 the last time around), Am Shalem, Otzma LeYisrael. While I could consider Am Shalem, I'm not willing to take a chance they'll pass the 2% threshold and have my vote count.

Not a great day for Israeli democracy and sovereignty.

The exciting part will start tonight when the results start getting announced and the process of putting together a government begins.

I expect it to be a messy and satisfying ONLY to Bibi who'll stay as PM.

LeHayyim ...

Are GOP Presidents bad for Israel?

Last week (Tuesday 23rd) Efraim Halevy (Director of the Mossad from 1998 to 2002 and the national security adviser to the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, from October 2002 to June 2003) wrote an op-ed piece in the New York Times "Who Threw Israel Under the Bus?" in which he suggests that Israel fares worse under Republican US Presidents than Democrat ones.

Indeed, whenever the United States has put serious, sustained pressure on Israel’s leaders — from the 1950s on — it has come from Republican presidents, not Democratic ones. This was particularly true under Mr. Obama’s predecessor, George W. Bush.

While in terms of the facts, he's correct. George HW Bush, and especially his Secretary of State James A. Baker III, were particularly brutal toward Israel. However, I'm not sure, as a  general rule, Halevey placed the issue within the best context. Each administration has its own set of issues and demands in part determined by the time in history, the international situation ... So while it may be true, what does it mean for the 2012 elections? That despite the strong pro-Israel rhetoric from Mitt Romney Israel needs to gird itself for a 'rough ride' if he's elected? That despite the criticism leveled at Barack Obama he'll (continue) to be good for Israel? I'm not sure that it's the correct message.

Part of the piece includes:

Despite the Republican Party’s shrill campaign rhetoric on Israel, no Democratic president has ever strong-armed Israel on any key national security issue. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, it was a Republican, Dwight D. Eisenhower, who joined the Soviet Union in forcing Israel’s founding father, David Ben-Gurion, to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula after a joint Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt.In 1991, when Iraqi Scud missiles rained down on Tel Aviv, the administration of the first President Bush urged Israel not to strike back so as to preserve the coalition of Arab states fighting Iraq. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir resisted his security chiefs’ recommendation to retaliate and bowed to American demands as his citizens reached for their gas masks.After the war, Mr. Shamir agreed to go to Madrid for a Middle East peace conference set up by Secretary of State James A. Baker III. Fearful that Mr. Shamir would be intransigent at the negotiating table, the White House pressured him by withholding $10 billion in loan guarantees to Israel, causing us serious economic problems. The eventual result was Mr. Shamir’s political downfall. The man who had saved Mr. Bush’s grand coalition against Saddam Hussein in 1991 was “thrown under the bus.”In all of these instances, a Republican White House acted in a cold and determined manner, with no regard for Israel’s national pride, strategic interests or sensitivities. That’s food for thought in October 2012.

And then there's the issue of "The Road Map" which he claims Israel was strong armed to accept because America was anxious to get Great Britain (Tony Blair as PM) on board for the first Iraq War.

Just as the British Parliament was about to approve the joint venture, a group of Mr. Blair’s Labour Party colleagues threatened to revolt, demanding Israeli concessions to the Palestinians in exchange for their support for the Iraq invasion. This demand could have scuttled the war effort, and there was only one way that British support could be maintained: Mr. Bush would have to declare that the “road map” for Middle East peace, a proposal drafted early in his administration, was the formal policy of the United States.
Israel’s prime minister at the time, Ariel Sharon, had been vehemently opposed to the road map, which contained several “red lines” that he refused to accept, including a stipulation that the future status of Jerusalem would be determined by “a negotiated resolution” taking into account “the political and religious concerns of both sides.”... March 13, 2003, senior Israeli officials were summarily informed that the United States would publicly adopt the draft road map as its policy. Washington made it clear to us that on the eve of a war, Israel was expected to refrain from criticizing the American policy and also to ensure that its sympathizers got the message [and]  that the road map be approved without any changes, saying Israel’s concerns would be addressed later. ...
From that point on, the road map, including the language on Jerusalem, became the policy bible for America, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations. Not only was Israel strong-armed by a Republican president, but it was also compelled to simply acquiesce and swallow the bitterest of pills.

OK. But what about Nixon, George W Bush? Then there are the issues that Obama, Clinton and Carter pressured Israel.

The bottom line is that America and its President (and Congress too) needs to advance the American Interest. Israeli interests are nice to think about but, when push comes to shove, American interests ALWAYS trump non-American ones, including Israel. I would expect the same from Israel to place her interests above all other countries.

So while Israel may value, and need, American support Israel and every country needs to keep in mind De Gaulle's adage "countries have no friends only interests."

Happy elections

Talking to the wall

Attended my first flash mob event last night. It was a quickly organized rally protesting Anat Hoffman's arrest at the Kotel [The Western Wall--a retaining wall from the Second Temple built during Herod's reign] last Tuesday evening for leading the Hadassah women in reciting shma while wearing a tallit [prayer shawl].

The incident raised a lot of anger among Diaspora Jews. The USCJ [United Synagogue for Conservative Judaism] organized a global flash mob for 13:00 EDT.

Her arrest raises a number of issues for me the way Israel addresses religious pluralism, the role/place of the Kotel in Israeli/Jewish affairs and separation of religion and state (aka "Church-State" issues).

While the specific facts, details of exactly what occurred are difficult to know, it seems fair to say that:

• Anat Hoffman was wearing a tallit (against the strict understanding of the law),
• the police have been, of last, actively arresting women for wearing a tallit during the monthly Women of the Wall [WOW] prayers (they meet every Rosh Hodesh),
• Anat Hoffman and WOW are interested in 'pushing the envelope' as far as possible with women's prayer activity at the Kotel, provoking haredi sensibilities to change the "status quo",
• the Israeli police are not "the best and the brightest" among security forces and thus can act in appropriate ways,
• the police took their orders from the Rabbi of the Kotel (with the acquiescence of the political and higher up police officials) as opposed to engaging their own discretion,
• the police unnecessarily roughed up Anat Hoffman,
• the haredim [ultra-Orthodox Jews] have "captured" the effective control of the Kotel through coalition politics, their regular use of the area (as opposed to other groups who don't come every day) and playing the mythological historical card that the area was always a place of (only) strict Orthodox halakhic practice. They expect to fully dictate the rules of usage for all visitors.

Instead of the Kotel serving as a reminder of the Temple and its role of creating peace (among the nations), it's become a battle site to work out Israeli and Jewish issues surrounding the Jewish life and practice. Instead of a place to express religious feelings it's a place to exercise political power. Whatever awe the remnant of the (Second) Holy Temple evokes among its visitors, it has become an awful experience to pray there. It's a place I generally avoid visiting.

The place belongs to the entire Jewish People. As such, provisions need to be made to ensure that every Jew, regardless of their religious orientation, has a place to show their reverence for the site. Under Israeli control/administration, the plaza behind the Wall itself was expanded to accommodate almost any size group. The State [of Israel] holds its annual Remembrance Day ceremony there, the army has its induction ceremony for the Paratroopers there, and until recently many other groups held ceremonies there too.

Within the last few years, some of the plaza has been taken over by the expansion of the mehitza [divider between praying men and women]. From a place that historically had no physical divider between men and women (see pictures of the Kotel from the late 1880s and pre-1948) to a place where men and women are actively discouraged mingling by obsequious "ushers" and "rules of conduct" issued by the Rabbi of the Kotel. Religious demands have encroached upon public space.

With the haredi political parties effectively holding the balance of power in successive Israeli governments, government officials including top bureaucrats (and the Courts) have acquiesced to their (unreasonable) demands and a mostly secular public has remained generally apathetic to demanding changes to make the system less biased. The long term haredi hegemony has displaced a Zionist rabbinate/bureaucracy with a haredi one that respects less non-haredi views and behaviors.

What does this mean?

First of all, there's a growing disconnect between the "believers" and the "non-believers" and little effort or mass of people seeking to close the gap. This encourages greater alienation and disrespect of The Other. Instead of discussions where people speak WITH each other, there are arguments where people scream AT each other.

The mixing of religion and politics means that sanctity acquires a secular identity and secular issues take on religious connotations. Mudslinging becomes an activity with "holy mud" and realities and meanings lose any sense of clarity.

Coming to the Kotel and discussing its use becomes an exercise of talking to a wall. Instead of a unifying experience with other Jews and Jewish history it has become an exercise in separation and alienation. An expression of triumphalism among individuals. A zero-sum gain for all (or no one).

When I talk to the Wall, I want G-d to listen and if I speak loud enough to have others respond to my plea instead of hearing my own echo.

Eyes on the prize

The Jewish Daily [English] Forward had an interesting article "Occupation Divides Israeli Protest Movement: Will Efforts To Broaden Focus Lead to Marginalization?" addressing the social protest movement in Israel, which recently renewed its active protest activities from last summer.

Last summer's protest focused principally on affordable housing and lowering the cost of living (food, public transportation, etc.). Tent cities were established throughout the country and thousands--estimated at close to half a million--marched in solidarity. In response, the (national) government established a study commission (Trajeman) to address social welfare issues. With the issuance of its report and government approval, the status quo was returned.

The sense of frustration was reinforced when several other national issues come to the fore; the need to reformulate a draft policy (which currently provides either a long-term deferral or exemption to haredi men, and a total exemption of Arabs by the IDF/military), corporate/economic concentration. And, the proverbial issue of "The Palestinian Territories".

Earlier this month, thousands marched to demand the implementation of a new national service policy--haredim to serve in either (specially designed) military units or a national/civilian service program, Arabs commit to civilian service corp (within or outside their communities)--which was being 'debated' by the cabinet/government.

Others, though are trying to move the social protest movement into a different direction, grafting a call to end the (Israeli) occupation of Judea & Samaria/The West Bank (and some changes in the Gaza policy as well).

As Nir Nader, a leader of the "No Social Justice Without Ending the Occupation" protest rally said:

You can’t have social justice for just 7 million people who are Israeli citizens — you have to take everyone under Israeli rule into consideration

The issue, has served to divide more than united the social protest movement.

Some more centrist protestors are taken aback by talk of the occupation. “It seems to me like an attempt to hijack what we have here for a narrow agenda. I don’t agree with their politics and they shouldn’t bring it in,” said Jonathan Divish, a 29-year-old accounts clerk from Jerusalem, who attended the larger, draft-themed July 7 demonstration. [Idan] Miller (a leader of Common Denominator, which organized the pro-draft/national service rally) believes that the demand to withdraw unilaterally is too simplistic, “when there’s a real fear that if we withdraw from [the West Bank] we will be attacked like from Gaza.”

It's even been divisive for the left-wing political community. Dov Khenin, a representative of the far-left Hadash party and one of the most popular politicians at last year’s demonstrations, argues

[T]hat focusing on the occupation is detrimental to effecting real social change. In his view, parties in Israel lack any impetus to formulate social policies that appeal to the public, because they know that they win or lose elections based on issues related to the conflict. “Israeli governments are elected not on social and economic issues, [but] rather on the dilemma of the territories and peace, and this is why the highly capitalist policies of the last 20 years continued,” 

If the goal of the social protest movement to affect change in the Israeli society, it's imperative to keep the message simple and focused, and, actively avoid splintering the voice and demand for change. The more complicated and multifaceted the message, the easier it'll be to have the government/opinion makers drive a wedge into the movement (and its momentum) as well as moving the movement "off message." If last year's protest which were fairly cohesive produced little real change, all the more so, if the protesters engage in grape-shot this summer.

If the goal is to make socioeconomic issues a real determining factor in the next elections--currently scheduled for mid-2013--it's essential to keep it as the central focus of the protest leaders. Eyes on the prize, otherwise, you'll just be sticks in the mud.

Welcome Back

After 1,941 days—over five years—in captivity, Gilad Shalit returned home to Israel today. In exchange for releasing him, Hamas negotiated the release of 1,027 jailed Palestinian (and Israeli-Arab) terrorists. While there's great joy for the Shalit family, the agreement also elicited a barrage of criticism. From bereaved families of terror victims who were killed in attacks planned, ordered and/or perpetrated by some of those freed in the deal (who petitioned the High Court of Justice to stop the deal), right-wing politicians (and their supporters) who “on principal” are against freeing convicted terrorists especially those with “blood on their hands” and those who see themselves as critics of the government and its component parts. In the end, despite the complaints, Gilad is free and home with his family and free to get his life back in order.

For me, it’s a mixed blessing. On the one hand, I’m ecstatic that he’s free and seemingly in good health—at least physically and I hope also mentally/emotionally. On the other hand, a lot of questions continue to nag me. Questions principally about the price Israel paid and the entire process of redeeming him from captivity,

1.      How did Israel allow him to get kidnapped?

2.      Why it took so long to finalize a deal?

3.      How come no rescue attempt was made?

4.      The role of public opinion and the media in “forcing the government’s hand” to make a deal.

5.      Was this a matter of placing personal concerns above the “national interest”?

6.      Its effect on the peace process.

7.      Its effect on international affairs; the Middle East in general and with Egypt, Hamas [Gaza], the PLO/Palestinian Authority [West Bank and Mahmud Abbas], the Arab world specifically, as well as other interested actors (the Quartet), the UN, and human rights groups.

8.      Is this good for Israel, both in for the short and long-term, especially with regard to deterring further kidnappings and violence?

According to Amos Harel, the abduction was planned in advance.

The terrorists captured Shalit by crossing the border from the Gaza Strip before sunrise through a tunnel hundreds of meters long. The tunnel had been dug under the border fence over the course of months. When the terrorists surfaced in Israeli territory, they came up behind the IDF troops, who were facing Gaza … At 5:13 A.M., three separate groups of terrorists attacked Shalit’s tank and a guard tower, along with an empty armored personnel carrier the IDF had placed there as a decoy. All three targets were hit by antitank fire. Shalit’s tank went up in flames, triggering a fire extinguisher. … Within six minutes of the assault, two terrorists had returned to Gaza with the wounded Shalit. IDF officers recall the period that followed as chaotic, noting that it took time before they realized a soldier was missing.

Here’s the first kicker:

The incident occurred less than a year after Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip. To some extent, the country was paying the price for repressing concern over the security situation in Gaza. Because the government considered it important to present the disengagement from Gaza as an accomplishment, the dangers posed by the new situation were played down. The defensive deployment around Gaza was only partial, and the IDF was not allowed to enter the strip to foil terrorist attacks.

The second kicker:

At his briefing after Shalit’s abduction, Halutz [the IDF Chief of Staff at the time] told reporters the IDF had no advance warning of an attack. This enraged Yuval Diskin, then head of the Shin Bet security service. In fact, the Shin Bet had given the army detailed, specific information about an expected attack. Based on this warning, the army had increased its troop levels somewhat along a 14-kilometer stretch of the border. But Halutz’s lie was quickly exposed when reporters interviewed the wounded member of Shalit’s tank crew: He confirmed that the sector had been on alert for a possible abduction.

The third kicker:

Ultimately, none of the senior officers involved paid the price of the debacle. Maj. Gen. Yoav Galant, who was GOC Southern Command at the time, was later nominated as IDF chief of staff, though his nomination was later withdrawn for unrelated reasons. Aviv Kochavi, then commander of the Gaza division, now heads Military Intelligence.

The fourth:

A subsequent investigation found that another tank commander actually saw the terrorists crossing back into Gaza with Shalit, but did not open fire because he was awaiting permission. In retrospect, this might have foiled the abduction, but it could also have resulted in Shalit’s death.

The prescient comment:

The day after the abduction, a defense official well-versed in hostage negotiations advised then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to close a deal immediately. “Give Hamas 250 people and it will be over,” he said. “Otherwise, it will take you three years and cost you 1,000 prisoners.”

Instead, Olmert opted to exploit the kidnapping to try to crush Hamas.

Five and half years later, the defense official appears correct.

An overstuffed cabinet

--Cleaning out my drafts--

Yesterday (3 Jan 2009) the new Government of Israel was introduced and formally sworn in. Benjamin Netanyahu is now officially the Prime Minister. His government of 71 people has a cabinet of 39--30 Ministers and (another) 7 Deputy Ministers--the largest in Israeli history. All the large parties--Likud (15 positions from 27 seats), Labour (5 from 13), Israel Beiteinu (5 from 15), Habayit Hayehudi (1 from 3), Shas (4 from 11), --have representation at the, now enlarged, cabinet table. Ynet has the full list and Haaretz has their pictures.

In these difficult economic times, I agree with Tzippi Livni's comment that such a large--gargantuan--government is misplaced.

The honorable prime minister-designate, the skinny man who is getting skinnier every day," Livni said, alluding to Netanyahu's feted metaphor of the private sector struggling to support the wasteful public sector. "On this thin man's shoulders you have now dumped this bloated government, filled with ministers of nothing, deputy ministers of nothings, and all sorts of other ridiculous titles," she said.

"A big and lavish cabinet is wrong at a time of economic constraints," said Livni, adding that "the public will have to carry the enormous weight of a bloated cabinet."

While her speech was certainly bitter and acerbic and many may claim it was an act of sour grapes, it was hard hitting and good to see that she actually has some fire in that belly. Whether it will help her maintain her political standing within Kadima and the country as a whole, only time will tell.

In response to her attack, Ehud Barak was quoted as saying her comments are

embarrassing statements... proof of her losing control." "The extent of her frustration is not a justification to say these things in the name of a 'more ethical politics,'" Barak's associates said.

"Ms. Livni should put her own house in order, and scrutinize the conduct of Kadima members, before giving lessons to others."

end for now