Cedar Chips

The UN brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah (Lebanon) is now a week old. The dust is beginning to settle, so it's time to see where the chips have fallen.

I Regional Actors

Israel: After the initial build up and the implicit expectation that the IDF, the vastly superior fighting force, would quickly dispose of Hezbollah, Israel feels that it lost this battle; Hezbollah is still armed and ready to fight another day and the IDF and the government is under heavy pressure to 'make amends'.

Hezbollah: Hezbollah can claim victory since they were able to stand up to a month-long battle with the "mighty" IDF, were able to sucker Israel to create immense collateral damage which helped to turn the tide against Israel, especially with regard to a number of Arab states like Saudi Arabia as well as the international community. They also seemed to have garnered even more support within Lebanon, despite the destruction they've wrought upon southern Lebanon, though with their cash handouts they seem to have people flocking to them.

Lebanon: "Beirut" was never a strong government, especially after the civil war of the 1980 and 90s, has achieved a mixed result. On the one hand, it appears to be greater control of its entire territory sending troops to patrol southern Lebanon and the UN/international community is looking to it as the central address. On the other, Hezbollah appears to have enhanced its political position by 'forcing' Lebanon to accept its armed presence (as of now, Beirut seems unwilling (more unable) to disarm the Hezbollah militia), Sinoria changed his tune regarding an initial disgust with Hezbollah's actions at the beginning of the hostilities to attacking Israel for its response and demanding the (partial) fulfillment of some of the Hezbollah agenda (e.g. the Sheeba Farms).

Syria and Iran: They seem to be the real winners. Their support, which continues, of Hezbollah has allowed them to enhance their regional and international standing (though not necessarily in a positive way) with little cost to their regime. Syria continues to host terrorists including the Hamas political leadership (Halad Mashal), seems to have prevented the new UNIFIL from being stationed along its border with Lebanon -- in an effort to prevent the rearming of Hezbollah -- and is presenting itself as a leading victor of the war. Iran played its cards (nearly) perfectly. It was able to distract the world from its nuclear buildup, enhanced its sphere of influence and advanced its Shiite perspective within Lebanon, and make the US look silly.

II The International Community

(a) the UN & Kofi Annan- The Security Council showed its true colors with how it resolved the conflict. Kofi Annan bullied the Security Council and by extension the world, that all that was required was an immediate ceasefire and the rest will work itself out (some time) later. He got his way. Resolution 1701 stopped the flighting, but has failed to end the conflict or address the "root causes". Two weeks later, all the pieces still not in place, so he's now in the region trying to finesse the sides to implement the entire resolution.

• The idea of a buffer zone seems to be accepted by most. However, there's no enforcement mechanism ("mandate") for UNIFIL.
• Lebanon isn't in a position to disarm the Hezbollah militia. Yet "Section VII" giving the UN forces the authority to use necessary force was omitted from the Resolution (mostly at the request of the Arab/Islamic bloc). Nobody wants to accept the responsibility to remove the military threat of Hezbollah. The lack of clarity of the mandate also delayed the troops commitments which in turn has delayed Israel from ending its blockade and removing all its troops from Lebanon.
• No real response was given the Syrian threat that it refuses to have UNIFIL troops along its border with Lebanon. They should have been censured and informed, since rearming Hezbollah is verboten, UNIFIL troops will be stationed along the border to ensure that doesn't happen.
• While 1701 is in many ways predicated upon UNSC 1559, the central positions -- i.e. the immediate disarming of nongovernmental militias be disarmed and the removal of foreign government influences -- has been glossed over and no penalties assessed (other than a weakened central Beirut government).

Much of the blame for the war, IMHO, is the result of six years of general neglect -- since Israel unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon -- and two years of failing to fulfill UNSC 1559.

(b) Europe - Despite being the victims of terrorism -- Spain, the UK, France and to a certain extent Holland and some of the Scandinavian countries -- their great concern/demand was that Israel respond with "proportional force" (whatever that means). Part of their issue (problem), I suspect, is the combination of a large and significant Islamic &/or Arab population within their borders and their largely digesting colonial history with a little anti-Semitism thrown in for good measure. While they're undoubtedly aware of the Iranian connection with Hezbollah, they failed to call Iran's bluff and demand (a) they cease and desist their support of terrorist organizations (including also Hamas in the Palestinian territories), (b) the end of the Iranian uranium enrichment program and (c) they (and the rest of the Arab/Islamic world) formally and actually recognize the right for Israel to exist. Instead, refuse to act decisively against either terrorism (and the incursion by Hezbollah across the "blue line") or the Iranian nuclear threat. Nor were they diligent in ensuring the full implementation of UNSC 1559.

[4 Sept 06: A number of EU countries have proclaimed that they will refuse landing rights for US munitions bound for Israel. What's the message here? It's clearly not supportive of either Israel or America.]

(c) the Arab/Islamic world - The most interesting 'situation' occurs with the Arab world. What started off as an opportunity to diminish the influence of Shiite Islam (read Iran) -- Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan at the forefront -- and thus an explicit condemning of Hezbollah, quickly turn 'neutral' and finally pro-Arab (and a tacit approval of Hezbollah) or more precisely, anti-Israel (the great unifying force of the region). I guess it didn't help that sympathy demonstrations occurred in their countries, though the authoritarian nature of the countries would suggest some degree of complicity with the demonstrators, and the Israeli bombing of civilian areas. That said, the countries could have worked behind the scenes to deal a better blow to Islamic (Shiite) terrorism. Oh well.

(d) the US - Last but not least are the Americans. As commendable as George W Bush's principled stand against terrorism and pro-Israel was, it was a strategic error. A further blow to the image of a strong and principled America.

• Bush overplayed his hand by not calling for a cease-fire earlier; one that would punished Hezbollah for their aggression while helping Israel create a safer border region.
• Better use of diplomacy was required to (i) clearly demonstrate Iran & serious role in arming Hezbollah, (ii) keep the world's eye upon Iran's nuclear program including ensuring Europe remained 'on board', (iii) separate Syria from Iran, (iv) keep the Arab countries behind neutralizing Hezbollah and (v) crafting a stronger UNSC resolution -- a clearly robust UNIFIL/multinational force, a censure of Hezbollah and its sponsors.

Three weeks later, 5 Sept, the Israeli soldiers remain captive, the Israeli blockade of Lebanon (air, land and sea) remains in place, the UNFIL forces have yet to be confirmed or be in place. The dust may have started to settle, however, the chips are still flying.
[written between 22 Aug and 5 Sept 2006]