What about Kiryat Malachi?

Yesterday, Yossi Melman in an Haaretz op-ed piece suggested that Israel should give up Jerusalem as its capital thus avoiding a conflict with the not yet declared (nacsent?) Palestinian state.

He started by stating:

There are about 200 countries in the world, but it seems that there are only two that attribute holiness to their capital: Israel and Palestine ... [and] three if we count the Vatican as a state.

Most states selected their capitals because of tradition, history, culture, geography, politics and convenience. The capitals serve as seats of government, the parliament and the Supreme Court, as well as the institutions of public governance. Some of the capitals are also the countries' largest cities, or commercial and cultural centers. Some countries moved their capitals (Germany from Bonn to Berlin, and Turkey from Istanbul to Ankara), or built new cities as capitals (like Brazil and Kazakhstan).

Most capitals contain religious symbols: cathedrals, mosques, temples, but they were not selected as capitals because of these. Even Saudi Arabia did not select Mecca or Medina, holy cities to Muslims, but Riyadh as its capital. Conclusion: The attitudes attributing holiness to a city were, in most countries, isolated from the political considerations that govern and shape day-to-day life.

Perhaps it is desirable that Israelis and Palestinians consider this possibility. Jerusalem has always been an obstacle to a settlement. … The Palestinians are willing for Jerusalem to be declared capital of Israel on condition that it is also their capital … The leaders on both sides, not only the religious leadership but also secular politicians, consider Jerusalem not merely their 'eternal capital' but attribute holiness to its stones, its homes and its symbols.

He later goes on to state:

It is hard to understand how two peoples, in the modern era, are willing to die for the religious symbolism of stones and places of worship. Morever, this "holiness" is preventing any chance of acheiving a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

If, as expected, the Israelis and Palestinians fail to reach agreement on Jerusalem, it might be better if they agreed on the following: Israel would announce temporarily it would move its capital to a different city...[and] the Palestinians will agree that Jerusalem will not be decalred their capital...This suspension will continue until the wounds are healed...

Forty-two years of Israel rule over a united city has not been good for it. It has become one of the poorest, dirtiest and failed cities in Israel...

Maybe Israel should relinquish its right to Tel Aviv as well, since it was forcibily taken away from the Arab Jaffa? Maybe Israel should "temporarily" move its capital to Kiryat Malachi? Afterall, it already has name a good name--"City of Angels" (because it was associated with Los Angeles, CA in the early 1950s as the North African immigrants were coming to Israel and warehoused in development towns). I doubt, any foreign country would express objections to this. And, besides, the area could really use as infusion of government funds and positive publicity. Maybe, it'll help the entire Negev region to become a fully functioning region in Israel instead of an economically disadvantaged region.

Then there are 'factual' and assumptive errors.

1. The idea that Jerusalem is poorer because of the unification is silly. Young and secular people are fleeing Jerusalem because of lack of real economic opportunity and the growing haredi influence in city affairs. Neither have anything to do with unification. Jerusalem has a negligible commercial/industrial base, so young need to look for work outside of Jerusalem which may necessitate also moving closer to work.
2. Jerusalem was declared the capital of Israel immediately upon the declaration of the state. Government offices were moved to Jerusalem when it was deemed safe (after the 1948 war). All this was well before 1967. The same can't be said for the Palestinian claim on Jerusalem.
3. The conflict over Jerusalem is not a religious one. Certainly, there are numerous conflicts over and in religious sites. Most, with the exception of The Temple Mount area, are internal conflicts between different sects/denominations of the specific religions.
4. That in the past--prior to the establishment of Israel--there were different proposals for dealing with Jerusalem, is at this point in history is immaterial. In 1948, the Arabs rejected that model, along with the UN Partition Plan both outrightly/de jure (Arab states voted NO on Oct 29, 1947 for the UN Partition Plan and the Arab League [Palestinian Arab representatives] also announced its rejection) as well as de facto by launching war on the newly declared State of Israel. 61 years later, is IMHO, too late to attempt to turn back the clock. Too much water (and blood) have passed under the bridge.

What Jerusalem does represent is a flash point for demonstrating the complexity and depth of feelings on both sides of the justice and validity of their sole claim to "ownership" of the land of Israel/Palestine. The idea of sharing is almost anthema to some (and IMHO a large number of the Arab and Palestinian elites and publics) on both sides.

Personally, I'm in favor of having two states living side by side in the Israeli portion of Mandatory Palestine. My two 'conditions' are: (a) the Palestinian/Arab portion needs to be demilitarized for an extended period of time and (b) that Israel maintain administrative control of the Old City (inlcuding the Temple Mount region) and the Jewish portions of Jerusalem. The peace process--"land for peace"--needs also to be a gradual but steady process. Trust needs to be secured to ensure a lasting and real peace is maintained.

Obama dons a kaffiyeh

While I doubt Barack H Obama will actually wear a kaffiyeh during his visit to the Middle East; it's not becoming of the President and the picture will only serve as fodder for his critics, the trip offers him the opportunity to enhance America's role in the the region and articulate the new American vision/foreign policy. Words may help shape perceptions of reality, but it doesn't necessarily make it so (in real and measurable terms).

Two issues will come together for him: (i) the reemergence of "the American Interest" and (ii) reaching out to the Arab/Islamic world.

I have long felt that the driving force (ideal or goal) of the American Interest is 'economic penetration', the expansion of the American industrial complex. The Arab/Islamic world offers a large and generally untapped population. It's untapped for a variety of reasons including: (a) the Arab boycott of companies that trade with Israel as the nationalization of previously prosperous industries (viz the oil/petroleum companies in Arabia), (b) that many American products are either too sophisticated or expensive, and finally (c) the historically close diplomatic, military relationship between Israel and America.

Leading up to the trip, the Obama administration has become openly vocal in its criticism of Israel particularly with regard to its settlement policy. In addition to its call for a two state solution (two states--Palestine and Israel--side by side) it's called for a total freeze including "natural growth" of settlement growth as well as the dismantling of "illegal" settlements. Despite expressions for "secure and recognized borders", the latter has raised rankles within Israeli government and society in general. Many--including me--believe that there's a paradigm shift in American policy vis-a-vis Israel and the Middle East in general. Israel is being offered on the altar for the sake of better relations with the Arab/Islamic world.

I remain skeptical about its prospects for real success.

Howard Feinman writing in Newsweek magazine writes about his trip in general and tomorrow's speech at Cairo University

Now comes the ultimate test of autobiographical speechmaking. Obama this week speaks at Cairo University, in the hub of Muslim-Arab culture. Perhaps the results will be Philly II: a skillful blend of grandeur and grit. On one level, he isn't risking much. After all, George W. Bush set the bar so low. All Obama has to do to be a success is elicit applause—rather than a fusillade of hurled shoes.

But he has privately told friends that his goal is far higher: nothing less than to help "reconcile Islam and modernity." He will pay homage to the Golden Age of that culture—its glorious achievements in mathematics, science, literature and diplomacy—and note that Muslim scholars rescued from oblivion the Greek and Roman (i.e., the "Western") canon. He also will draw on the by-now-familiar story of his own life. A Christian son of an African-Muslim father, he spent years in Muslim-majority Indonesia, attending a public school run by, but not suffused with, the teachings of Islam. All of this, Obama thinks, not only allows him, but obliges him, to play a grand role as bridge builder.

Yet as Fineman points out, Cairo isn't Philadelphia (where he sought to create distance between himself ans his (former) mentor and minister Rev. Jeremiah Wright) and Egypt isn't America. As he raises expectations and speaks of hope,

A bigger risk is that the incorrigibles in the neighborhood—the true terrorists—will see him as a naif and be emboldened by that thought. But the biggest danger for Obama is that he will become a prisoner of his own words, and the high expectations they create. The human-rights community expects him to reflect its concerns about political repression. Palestinians will want him to address the running sore of Gaza, at least. Announcing student exchanges or new development programs won't be enough. "I'm sure he'll give a fine speech," said John Esposito, an expert on Islam at Georgetown University. "The better it is, the more action people will expect. People are getting very tired of words."

Expectations aside, I'm also not sure that any outsider--someone outside the Arab &/or Islamic world--can (never mind will) bring the Arab world into the modern world. Beyond the anger the Arab/Islamic world has for the modern western world who they continue to believe subjects them to ongoing degeneration--Osama bin-Ladin is merely a recent and populist expression, it also exists among the Arab elites--, I believe that the political reality (read current political leadership) tends towards totalitarian governments--including Obama's Egyptian host Hosni Mubarak.

As Michael Crowley writes in The New Republic "Plank" blog from Cairo, the major concern of the (neutered) Muslim Brotherhood isn't so much Barack Obama as it is internal Egyptian affairs,

Habib [deputy chair of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood] explained his skepticism about Obama's speech here on Thursday. "If there is no radical change in American policies, I don't think it matters what he says," Habib told me through a translator. "I pity Obama because I know he is not on his own. He is surrounded by different forces--business conglomerates and the Zionist lobby." Nor did Habib care much for the prevailing debate in the US about how much emphasis to place on democracy promotion. "Understand that democracy in the Bush administration was not a goal itself but a curtain to hide the atrocities in Iraq and Afghanistan." When it comes to Egypt's internal affairs, all the Muslim Brothers ask, Habib said, was that the US end its support for Hosni Mubarak's regime. "We don't want anything from the U.S. but to back off from supporting existing dictatorships. That's it," he said.

So, despite all the hoopla surrounding Obama's tour, the only thing I expect to change in the Arab world is to have its anti-Israel feelings validated and Israel's support and security diminished. So instead of a win-win situation, it'll be a losing proposition for all who seek a safer and freer world.

Labour pains

Several hours ago, the Labour Party voted to join the next Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu and Avigdor Leiberman. Along with the Shas party Netanyahu now has a 66 seat government.

I'm not sure if this good or bad news--for Israel, the Likud Party and Netanyahu, the Labour Party and Ehud Barak, Ofer Eini (the Chair of the Histadrut [Workers' Organization], the Kadima Party and Tzippi Livni. Does a 66 seat government of four parties mean a more stable government, one that will last the four year term, or a short-term bandage solution and they'll be another set of elections in less than a year?

The best part of forming a new government, is that the old one will resign. Olmert will vacate the PM residence and have his day in court which could make his search for a new residence easier if he's sent to jail.

As Mazal Mualem reports in Haaretz , the Labour vote was a contentious one. While 78% of the committee members voted, only 54% voted in favour of joining the government. It's still possible that the 'dissenters' would break away from the party. If that happens, it'll be the death knell for the party. Then, there's the issue that initially Barak was adamant that the Labour voter wanted them to sit in the opposition, and then he flip-flopped to now suggest ahead of the vote:

Ahead of the vote, Barak took the stand and in an impassioned speech said "we are responsible for the Labor Party, but we also have a responsibility to the state of Israel, to peace, to security. We don't have a back-up country, Yitzhak Rabin said that, and it is still true."

"Labor voters want to see us in the government, they want to see us there because we don't have a spare country".

What makes the issue even more incredible is that Netanyahu made Labour [read Barak] an offer he couldn't refuse.

For its 13 seats, Labour was offered/given:

• five cabinet posts, including two of the most senior - Defense Minister and Trade and Industry Minister - and another two deputy ministerial positions.
• in the socio-economic area (the bone for Ofer Eini)

there's NIS 100 million for retraining people for different professions, NIS 200 million for funding day and afternoon care for working women's children, investment in factories and a commitment not to cut salaries in the public sector. Furthermore, the deal promises a gradual hike in benefits for pensioners over the coming three years totaling NIS 950 million (this subject actually appeared in a similar deal between Labor and Kadima last year that was never signed), and a series of other agreements.

The deal's masterpiece is the creation of a forum that the government, employers and the Histadrut will all attend and will have the status of an advisor to the prime minister.

The great deal for Labour means that Likud and its leaders--those expecting a high level cabinet post--will pay the price. Will this mean another round of Bibi alienating his own party and core constituency?

The sense I have is that Bibi thinks people voted for him to be the PM (a la the direct elections for PM of 1996 [Bibi > Peres] and 1998 [Barak > Bibi]) with the result that he formed a government by giving away the store to the other parties while leaving his party out in the cold (not, that Likud had a large number of seats to speak about). The fact of the matter is that Kadima actually polled a larger number of seats [28] to Likud's 27.

In other news, here's what the other coalition partners are expected to receive.

First, let's deal with Shas.

On Monday, a coalition agreement was signed (after an informal agreement was made earlier this year which prevented Tzippi Livni from forming a government and forcing an election) which gives Shas

• four portfolios in the new government.

Party chief Eli Yishai will become interior minister and deputy prime minister, MK Ariel Atias will become minister of housing, Yitzhak Cohen will receive the new government's religion portfolio and Meshulam Nahari will become a minister-without-portfolio in the Prime Minister's Office.

• Shas was also promised an increase of NIS 1.4 billion in child welfare payments over the next three years.
• billions of shekels to yeshivas, while depriving Bedouin families of child allowances.
• a compromise on the ultra-Orthodox party's demand for the education portfolio and on the appointment of an exclusive minister for ultra-Orthodox education in the next government.

Still to determined are the places for Bayit Hayehudi (NRP), National Union/Ichud Haleumi and UTJ. Negotiations continue with all three parties.

Underlying the stability of the government is how it deals with religion-state affairs. Issues like civil union, conversion are flash points for both the religious and secular parties. While the UTJ has agreed to civil unions, they are only willing to have it for non-Jewish couples. There's no movement regarding conversions. I'm not sure how the "Jewish" (if only in their own mind) voters for Leiberman--former USSR--and Ethiopian feel about this. Then there are non-Orthodox and secular Jews who feel strongly about not relying on the Rabbinate to approve or perform their weddings/marriages.

Finally, there's Tzippi Livni and Kadima. Did she miss her chance to create a true national unity government, by holding out for a PM rotation? Will she be able to build up the party in opposition enough to actually win the next election? If there's an election in the next year, she may be able to have another shot at becoming PM. If the government lasts the four years, she may have missed the boat.

In terms of Israel, I continue to believe that the cobbled together coalition with smaller parties, is bad for Israel. The voter threshold needs to be increased and some form of direct elections for members of Knesset are needed. As long as sectarian parties are part of the government, any meaningful reform isn't going to happen.

Then there's the issue of the size of the cabinet. Instead of streamlining and reducing the number of cabinet members, it looks like it'll be another bloated and overcrowded cabinet table. While it's inefficient in the best of times, in an economic slowdown, monies would be better spent on improving the lot of ALL Israelis, it'll instead be dedicated, really wasted, in providing "the perks of office" to a bunch of politicians (many of whom, are less than qualified to serve as anything in government). Oh well...

Too bad.

Stay tuned for further developments.

1,000 days and counting

Today is the 1,001st day of captivity for Gilad Shalit. His family closed down its protest test just before Shabbat and returned home in the Galil.

Supposedly, the government has spent the last (nearly) three years actively seeking the return of Gilad as well as the two soldiers captured by Hezbollah (Udi Regev z"l and Eldad Goldwasser z"l). Now that the government of Ehud Olmert is actually in its final days--Benjamin Netanyahu just received a 14 day extension to form his coalition government--he's placed the negotiations into overdrive. For the last few weeks the discussions with Hamas under Egyptian auspices have been active. It's all in an effort to resolve the issue before Olmert leaves the stage.

Why it's taken so long to actively work for his release suggests that Israel had it on a very low burner--if not totally off the stove. Now that Olmert's time is drawing to a close, his [Olmert] concern for his legacy has pushed him to actually get the ball rolling.

Yet, success remains elusive. Despite media reports since the last election that an agreement is imminent, nothing has happened.

In the meantime, it seems that Hamas has been upping its demands of who it wants released and refusing to accept Israel's demands that some released prisoners be sent into exile (not permitted to live in either Gaza or the West Bank). Israel has stood firm regarding the list of releasees and conditions of release.

In the background unity talks between Fatah (W Bank) and Hamas (Gaza) are continuing (in some form).

When I visited the protest tent last week, across the street was a counter protest against releasing prisoners "with blood on their hands" (i.e. convicted of murder/terrorism). While I certainly understand their position--the last prisoner exchange gave Israel two bodies for a large number of Palestinian/Lebanese terrorists, including the someone who murdered a child on the Nehariya beach--and their concern that once released they'll immediately return to their terrorist activities (against Israel).

I'm not sure that Israel has much choice in the matter. They need to release convicted terrorist murderers to get Gilad Shalit back. Israel must do everyone to return its captured (and dead) soldiers. I only hope that Shalit is still alive. If not, the price is too steep for a coffin.

Stay tuned...please god Gilad will be home for Pesach.

Justice is done

It appears that there is agreement on who will serve as the Justice Minister in the Netanyahu government. (Prof) Yaakov Neeman has, supposedly, accepted the position. That's one down, who knows how many more (cabinet positions) to go.

That Daniel Friedmann will end his term, I believe is good news. Despite whatever qualifications he holds to serve as justice minister and his opinions/positions, his support by Avigdor Lieberman (Yisrael Beitenu) a suspect in an ongoing criminal investigation made his suitability also suspect. I'm not sure that his commitment to stay out of the way of police investigations of politicians--Ehud Olmert, Lieberman, ...--was enough to convince me he was appropriate in the first place. The JM (justice minister) needs to actively advocate cleaner politics and government ethics (free of corruption), a more efficient judicial system (reforming the Rabbinical Courts as well as the criminal/civil courts) and somehow reform the Supreme Court without exacerbating the extremism on both sides (the anti-Court [religious groups, right-wingers] and the pro-Court [leftists who use the court as a way to challenge the Knesset laws and army rulings, and supporters of Aharon Barak's judicial philosophy]. Politicizing the judicial system--making it more accountable and determined by the elected political structure--may sound good on paper, however, in light of (i) a broken electoral system and (ii) a Knesset that responds to special interests over national (rational, apolitical) policy, means that the High Court frequently becomes the court of last resort for enacting public policy. It's not a pretty site and requires a lot of attention to correct. The next JM needs to be committed to push a strong but sophisticated agenda to clean up the system by convincing all the "stakeholders" that change is necessary and establishing a workable consensus to enact the changes.

In other news, coalition building is inching along. It appears that Yisrael Beitenu has signed a coalition agreement which makes Leiberman the foreign minister and gives it four other cabinet posts (internal security, tourism, infrastructure and immigrant absorption portfolios), as well as chairmanship of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. Lost in the negotiations were many of the issues it had championed during its campaign, including civil unions, a solution to Jewish conversion problems and changes in the system of government and the electoral system.

In light of intensification of the police investigation of Lieberman , I wonder how long the deal will hold. Additionally, supposedly, the agreement with Netanyahu is to include a clause saying that it is valid only for a narrow government, the expansion of which would necessitate a new arrangement.

How this will play out with the other potential partners; the haredi parties (especially Shas), the right-wing parties and creating a national unity government with Kadima and/or Labour only time will tell. The deadline for creating a government is 3 April. I doubt the government will go against conventional wisdom. It'll be a right-leaning government with Shas.

Nothing changes except the head

Last Wednesday, Israel observed "Family Day" (commemorating Henrietta Szold's birthday) and the official opening of the 18th Knesset. While there's no connection between the two events and there's not even a new government in place, life goes on and we're all family.

The formation of the government is going to be an "interesting ride". Currently, the two "large parties" -- Kadima and Labour-- are refusing to join the government and Netanyahu has been unable to get their decision reversed. For Labour, I think its a given that there's little opposition to the Ehud Barak's position. The same can't be said for Tzippi Livni and Kadima. Here, there are some voices, particularly Shaul Mofaz, who want the party to join the government. Hopefully, those voices will be overruled and Kadima will set in opposition.

The only way I could see a true national unity government put in place is, if Netanyahu agrees to have only the three old-style large parties be in the coalition and commits himself to: (a) rotate the PM chair, (b) reform the electoral system and (c) agrees to a specific time period of governing--say three years--before calling a new election with the new rules in place. It doesn't seem in the realm of possibility, never mind probability, at this time.

Netanyahu has made too many promises/commitments to other parties, especially Shas to get himself elected as the head of a right-wing political bloc. He's also interested in establishing a wide government/coalition (i.e., significantly bigger than the needed 61 seat majority). And, then there are the ego issues.

The bottom line is:

• An expensive government from paying off all the small(er) parties to join the coalition -- the 'real' right-wingers, the religious parties and Avigdor Lieberman.
• It'll be short-lived. I expect there'll be new election within 18 months.
• A government alienated from the international community, which will make it difficult for Israel to advance its international agenda--containing Hamas (in the Gaza) and Iran's nuclear ambitions and capabilities.
• Another ineffectual government in addressing its pressing issues--economic, social and environmental. It'll be difficult, if not impossible, to set and maintain a clear policy/priorities course of action as each party will demand (and expect) veto power over areas/decisions deemed detrimental to their cause/interest/population (or perceived electorate).

It's SOS [Same Old Shit/Stuff] all over again.

Nothing hurts more than the truth

This morning's Haaretz Barak Ravid reports that PM Ehud Olmert went on a rampage at yesterday's weekly Cabinet meeting, striking out at, among others, the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute for comments made in their 2008 Annual Report.

Ravid reports:

The official topic of the meeting was the institute's annual report assessing Israel's situation and that of the Jewish people as a whole. But as institute director Avinoam Bar-Yosef was finishing his presentation of the report's main findings, Justice Minister Daniel Friedmann passed a note to Olmert drawing his attention to page 31 of the document, which stated that Israel's leadership was about to change due to "its ongoing corruption problem." The report declared that Olmert's resignation last fall constituted "a depressing climax to the parade of corruption in the senior echelons" of government and expressed hope that "out of the ruins of the Olmert government, perhaps a cleaner political culture will emerge."

Olmert read this passage and erupted. "This is none of Diaspora Jewry's business and none of the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute's business," he shouted. "On what basis do you conclude this? I haven't been charged with anything yet; these are only suspicions. And former president [Moshe] Katsav" - whose case the report also cited - "has also yet to be indicted."

Olmert was further outraged by a passage declaring that Diaspora Jews viewed the Second Lebanon War as a failure. "What are you talking about?" he demanded. "I can bring military experts who will prove that the war brought us great achievements. Who appointed you? Why are you sticking your nose into these matters, and on what basis do you draw these conclusions? Why don't you tell the truth? That's what happens when you let people who hide behind curtains write a report."

That remark was a reference to former institute president Prof. Yehezkel Dror, a member of the commission that investigated the Second Lebanon War, who hid behind a curtain at a public event a few weeks ago to avoid shaking Olmert's hand. However, the institute said that Dror had left his post a few months ago and was not involved in writing the report.

The report itself, in the English version of page 35, writes:

2008 was a dismal year in Israeli political life. The long-simmering crisis of Israeli political leadership brought to the fore by the Second Lebanon War of 2006 showed no signs of abating.

Following on the resignation in 2007 of President Moshe Katzav resulting from a number of criminal charges, including rape, 2008 saw the indictment of Finance Minister Avraham Hirschsohn for theft, money laundering, fraud and other crimes involving diversion of charitable funds for his own personal use. This was only the latest in a series of prosecutions and criminal allegations involving highranking
Israeli officials in recent years, including the former justice minister as well as the two chief rabbis.

The multiple criminal allegations against Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, culminating in the police’s recommendation that charges be brought against him and the subsequent submission of his resignation on September 21, 1008, offered a depressing climax to this parade of corruption in high places. Olmert has remained unrepentant and defiant, confident that he will in the end be vindicated and have the last laugh over his many foes.

To respond to Olmert.

1. I think the report is a fair assessment of the situation in Israel.
2. If you expect Diaspora Jewry to support the State of Israel (not to mention your own pet projects and, as you are currently accused of, your pocket), you can't pick and choose what's appropriate and what's not. People deserve to possess all the information to make their own informed decisions.

What I see as the real issue is your inability to accept responsibility for your behaviour. Your defiant denial of having done anything wrong--screwing up with the (Second) Lebanon War, the rampant corruption on a personal (what the Police are currently investigating and the cause for announcing your resignation) and governmental (keep Haim Ramon around despite his criminal record, appointing Daniel Freidman as Justice Minister). While others accepted responsibility for their (failure) role in the Lebanon War--the IDF Chief of Staff (Dan Halutz) and Minister of Defence (Amir Peretz)--and resigned, you refused to follow their lead. Then, instead of outright resigning at the earliest opportunity, you stretched out your reign as long as possible. You must also accept responsibility for the need for the recent elections and the loss of rule for Kadima (your party). You placed personal interests over the needs of the country and your own political party.

You're just angry that others are calling it as they and others see it. Grow up!

Rather than having a temper tantrum, you need to quietly go away and hope to rehabilitate your political legacy.

Electoral reform - take 1

Today's Haartez has two articles about electoral reform in Israel emanating from the inconclusive results of this week's election.

Both suggest that the path will be a difficult one.

Shahar Ilan in his article “Major reforms are unlikely, but electoral thresholds could be raised” suggest that only minor changes will happen if only because it's unclear what people want and small parties--some of whom may be part of the next government--are against tinkering with a system that gets them elected and part of the government (cabinet/coalition).

Menachem Ben Sasson, the recent chair of the Knesset's Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, and a former Rector of Hebrew University in his op-ed piece "Why we have failed to change the system" lays out what he sees as the goal of the process and why it didn't happen during the last Knesset.

If that is a true reflection of the public's mood to place the issue on the agenda of the next Knesset, then great. If it's just a elite sentiment or a momentary fit of venting to the results of the recent elections, reform is doomed to failure.

For me, the election hasn't made the issue any more acute than before the election. The fact that two parties won near identical number of seats and there's no clear 'winner' in terms of who's the natural person to be asked first to form the government. The fact that Kadima/Tzippi Livni won the largest number of seats suggests, if only to me, that the public doesn't want Likud/Netanyahu to be the government. On the other hand, the fact that right-wing parties have a clear majority of the Knesset seats, suggests that people want a nationalist/right-wing government which Likud is better suited for than Kadima. It's also fair to say that the country has drifted to the right--the need to take a harder line vis-a-vis the Palestinian issues. That would explain the demise of the Jewish left-wing parties, especially Meretz in the election. (Labour was also affected, but their demise may be a result of other more long-term and complicated reasons including the revolving door leadership.)

Menachem Ben Sasson lays out what he views as the goals of electoral reform. In terms of the goals, he writes:

...reduce coalition parties' ability to threaten stability include increasing (from 61 today) the number of Knesset members needed to propose a replacement prime minister; a law that grants the head of the largest Knesset faction the first right to try to form a coalition (which will encourage voters to choose large parties); and a return of the cap on the number of ministers to 18.

In response, he suggests:

This goal can also be brought closer by raising the percentage of the overall vote needed for a party to enter the Knesset. It can be furthered by the so-called Norwegian law, which would require all ministers and deputy ministers except party chiefs to resign from the Knesset and be replaced by the next person on their party's
list. There would also be an amendment to the way the budget is passed and supervised when carried out. Elected officials' commitment to the public would be strengthened by a new Elections Law in which half the MKs would be elected in local balloting.

Then he asks

If the problems are so grave and the way toward a solution is clear, where have we, the elected officials, been for the past three years?

Very soon after the establishment of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee in the outgoing Knesset, the coalition parties and most other Knesset factions embarked on a move to bring about the legislation discussed above. Thirty-eight meetings in 2007 were devoted to drafting bills to be voted on in the committee. But just when the work was prepared for the vote, some committee members (from the coalition as well) pulled out. The draft laws are languishing in the committee stage.

Just as the vote was coming up, Shas, who had until then strongly supported the bill (in increase the voter threshold) withdrew its support, supposedly due to pressure from the other smaller religious party.

These parties later hinted that if they did not win the required percentage they would join up with Shas, along with their rabbinical establishments, threatening Shas' rabbinical establishment. Shas' leaders explained their change of position on the "head of the largest faction" law by saying that their voters, who hold right-wing positions, would vote for Likud because of concerns that the head of a less-hawkish party might become prime minister. The way Shas conducted itself in the last election (the "distant-relatives" tango between Shas and Likud) indicates that their
concerns were sincere.

It's ironic how Shas was manipulated by the other haredi parties in the same way they have, in past, sought to extort concessions from the party seeking their support to join the coalition.

In terms of the goals of the process

• I agree that the government need to be made more stable and members of Knesset more accountable to the public and not just to their party members/ leadership.
• Raising the necessary threshold for election to the Knesset as well as dissolving the government more difficult and creating a form of direct elections for Knesset members makes sense. For the former, I hope it will "encourage" (force or dissuade) smaller parties to merge as a larger bloc and individuals to avoid turning small--often personal--slights or policy differences into a 'cult of personality' by creating their own party. Better, allowing for active intra-party factions.
• Having half the Knesset elected directly by a region/riding, will (hopefully) create an atmosphere of true accountability to the public (electorate) instead of the party apparatchiks who created the party list for public consideration/election.
• Enacting a law that the leader of the largest faction automatically is invited to form a government will cause people to vote for the bigger parties to be suspect. While, people should be encouraged to vote for a large party, I'm not sure having only a small number of large parties is either desirable (on the theoretical level) or workable in Israel (practicable). Israel continues to be a country full of divergent voices, divided not only on political lines--right vs left, free market vs socialist/protective, peace vs hard-line, pro vs anti settlements--but also on ethnic and national--Jew, Arab (Muslim, Christian, Druze, Bedouin)--and religious outlook--observant vs secular (and everyone--the majority--who define themselves as traditional and not in either extremist camp). Many groups deserve a voice in the Knesset, though not the 'right' to have their minority agenda foisted upon the majority population.
• Even worse, is his suggestion of enacting the "Norwegian law". What Israel needs is a more publicly accountable government. Ministers need to be directly accountable to the public and its legislative body. Having the cabinet not be members of the Knesset seems backwards to me. Unless and until there's a true presidential electoral system/framework, either like France or the US, cabinet members and the PM MUST be a member of the legislature [the Knesset].

The road will be a long one. Hopefully, the larger parties, either those elected to the largest number of seats (Kadima[28], Likud[27] and Yisrael Beitanu[15] = 70 seats) or the traditional large parties (Kadima, Likud and Labour[13] = 68), will put aside their egos and agree to form a national unity government for a specific period whose primary goal will be enacting electoral reform. It will "kill two birds with one stone"; (a) they'll be a stable government for a set period and no elections and (b) will keep the smaller parties out of the coalition so the best interests of the country (larger parties and more stable governments) can be considered and enacted.

While both options present a majority government, I'm not sure either will happen. Too much vested interests and ego involved to do the rational thing. Too bad.

A-rod or a-fraud?

Taking a short break from Israeli politics, to reflect upon the recent uproar over the disclosure that Alex Rodriguez, used performance enhancing drugs while with the Texas Rangers in 2001-3.

Unlike Timothy Egan in his "Outpost" blog "Young and Stupid" I don't see what's the fuss and anger about what Rodriguez did.

[AR] “I was young, I was stupid, I was naive.”

Whoooaaa, A-Rod. Stop the tape. For the record, he was pumped up on steroids and other drugs from ages 26 through 28, while the highest-paid player in baseball, with a 10-year, $252 million contract.

He was a man in full, but wants us to think of him as a boy. He was a corporation unto himself, a very calculated one at that. He cheated to get an edge. Then he lied about it.

But if nothing else, the A-Rod ‘roid admission this week — after he famously looked Katie Couric in the eye in 2007 and denied ever taking drugs to help him perform — gives us a chance to parse the oldest of lame excuses: young and stupid.

The best-known contemporary example is George W. Bush, who explained away spending nearly half his adult life in a stupor of alcoholic and self-indulgent excess by saying: “When I was young and irresponsible, I was young and irresponsible.”

After that, no reporter dared to ask about allegations of cocaine use, or try to get him to explain his arrest for driving while intoxicated.

But Bush-the-life-story could have been a great teaching tool, or at least the start of a national debate on the young-and-stupid excuse and its consequences.

Comparing him to George W Bush who hid his drug use--alcohol and cocaine--from the American public is way overboard. GWB continues, even after he left office, to in any way acknowledge his condition; i.e. "My name is George and I'm an alcoholic/substance abuser (addict)".

That no one from the press/media "dared to ask..." is the media's issue. They certainly had adequate access to him and could have raised the issue any number of times, either directly or through investigative reporting. That they didn't is a great disservice to America and because of the position of the President, by extension to the entire world.

A-Rod is a professional ball player and not the President of the US. Being an idol or proposed "role model" doesn't require him to be either paragon of virtue or even "nice." His contract requires him to preform his duty on the baseball field. If he's drunk or otherwise incapacitated, he's liable to be benched, fired/released or removed quite easily. See Micheal Vick and his awful behavior. See also many of the old time baseball players like Babe Ruth or Ty Cobb. The latter two, had the fortune of playing and living in a different era which wasn't as transparent (for good and for bad) as today.

The same can't be said for a President. Alcohol abuse, among other personal issues, disqualified John Tower from becoming the Secretary of Defense for George H.W. Bush (he was replaced by Dick Cheney). Somehow, for a position of far greater responsibility it was ignored. Also important to note is the impeachment process is far more time consuming and complicated than merely firing an employee.

The Henry Hyde comment,

The height of absurdity for the y&s excuse had to be Henry Hyde, the late silver-maned congressman who stood in judgment of Bill Clinton while chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. When it came out that the ever-pious Hyde had carried on a four-year affair with a married woman, he called it “a youthful indiscretion.”

Except Hyde was 45 years old, a married father of four, while engaging in this act of tender-age passion.

is well taken. However, here, too I see other parallels. J Edgar Hoover's homophobic image was a reaction to his closet homosexuality--which here too, was conveniently covered up until his death.

Lastly, you write:

A-Rod will likely face no legal consequences, nothing from the the toothless barons of baseball. Phelps took his hit for recreation. Rodriguez did his drug to cheat the game and himself. He lied about it. And then he blamed it all on his age and pressure to perform because of his oversized contract.

So, yes, while Rodriguez behavior is deplorable and maybe worse than Micheal Phelps "bong" incident, your reaction is over the top.

That Rodriguez "cheated the game", is not that newsworthy. Forgive me for being cynical, sports are full of cheaters. The object of the game is to win the game any way you can--just don't get caught. In comparison to some of the other "druggies", he has come clean (or at least cleaner) by (a) publicly acknowledging his stupidity (the same can't be said for Bonds, Clemens and others) and (b) stopping to cheat on his own.

So, while I doubt the whole truth is out either about A-Rod/Fraud or the entire steroid era in Major League Baseball, and I agree that the Commissioner (and the other leaders in baseball) will do nothing--meaningful or otherwise--to clear up the situation, I am satisfied with what's transpired over the last week or so. If Rodriguez stays clean and is pro-active in wiping away the stain of steroids/ performance enhancing drugs in sports and especially in youth sports while maintaining his star-ness, I believe he should be inducted into the Hall of Fame. (I'll even accept an asterisk or note about his past behavior on his plaque.)

For a different perspective, see Doug Glanville's guest op-ed in Monday's, 9.Feb, New York Times.

It's clearly right, but is it good?

I am disappointed but not surprised with the results of yesterday's election.

Today's unofficial results, with 100% of the polls reporting but still waiting for the publication of the official results, show that Kadima and Tzippi Livni won the largest number of seats, the right-wing political parties won a majority of the seats in the Knesset. It appears that Bibi Netanyahu will be the next PM.

The media reports the following:

Right
Likud 21%/27 seats
Yisrael Beitenu 12/15
National Union 3/4
HaBayet Hayehudi 3/3
49 seats

Religious
Shas 9/11
UTJ 4/5
16 seats

Centre
Kadima 23/28
28 seats

Left
Labour 10/13
Meretz 3/3
16 seats

Arab Parties
UAL/Ta'al 4/4
Hadash 3/4
Balad 3/3
11 seats

The winners and losers

Winners:

1. The right-wing parties in general and Avigdor Lieberman in particular who is the "king-maker" as complicated as that role may be for him.
2. Tzippi Livni who fought off oblivion by actually leading Kadima to garner the largest number of seats.
3. Bibi Netanyahu who despite loosing the popular vote has the sufficient political backing to form the next government.
4. Bayit Hayehudi (NRP) who beat the predictions that they would only eek into the Knesset.

Losers:

1. All the parties, mostly from the left, who lost seats.
2. The Labour party who fell to 4th place and the opposition. (Though in the long run, it might actually work to its benefit.)
3. Political parties who focused on domestic issues with no comment on exsternal ones (i.e. the Arab-Israeli conflicts).
4. The Israeli public who, once again, may find itself going back to the polls in another 18 months.

For me personally, I was deeply disappointed that the Green Movement-Meimad only garnered 23,000 votes or 1%. With a mandate valued at around 25,000 and the voting threshold at 2% of the valid votes, all it's ballots are considered invalid and amount to a non-vote--a "wasted vote."

What does this mean?

As the Jerusalem Post reports, it's all in the hands of Leiberman and Yisrael Beitenu (which for all intents and purposes are the same, since Lieberman hand picks the party list). He remains valuable for all--to strengthen the rightist bloc, to bridge Kadima with the left-wing--but, several complications remain: (a) he needs to temper his demand for a senior cabinet post as I doubt anyone will agree to make him Defence Minister (Finance? maybe), (b) he's detested by Meretz (who's publicly said it would not sit with him), the Arab parties and the religious parties, and (c) he has the reputation of being fickle--joining an unexpected government and then unexpectedly bolting the government--creating uncertainty and instability.

Though the party had apparently won just 15 seats, half that of the Likud's 28 and Kadima's 30, the distribution of results makes any stable government very difficult.

In principle, party chief Avigdor Lieberman can comfortably join a center-left coalition, since his party does not oppose a Palestinian state and his primary voting bloc demands a social agenda closer to that of the Left.

But such a coalition would place Lieberman together with the same Arab parties whose leadership bore the brunt of Israel Beiteinu's campaign attacks over "disloyalty" to the state.

Without the 10 seats won by the three Arab parties, the left-wing coalition would shrink to a narrow 62 and place Israel Beiteinu in an unlikely partnership with the social-democratic Meretz, a situation that party's leaders are unlikely to countenance.

As the possibility for a strong ideologically consistent bloc wanes, Israel Beiteinu looks set to become the linchpin for a national unity government. A Likud-Kadima coalition would probably require an agreement of rotation in the premiership as one party - Kadima - has apparently emerged larger, but at the head of a smaller ideological bloc.

Even so, such a coalition would amount to just 58 seats, requiring a stable third partner. Lieberman may be the most attractive partner in such a coalition, as his domestic demands, including civil unions in lieu of marriage and governmental reform, would be palatable to the larger parties.

At the same time, his ability to make extravagant demands, such as the Defense portfolio, would be limited by the ease with which the two larger parties could replace him with the haredim or even the four-to-five seat Meretz.

Haaretz also agrees with the Post's assessment though it strongly suggests that Lieberman will join a right-wing government

Lieberman said that his party will prefer to join a national right-wing government, hinting that he would prefer joining forces with Netanyahu over Livni. "We always said that this is the government we want, and this is the way our hearts lean," he stressed.

Lieberman, who spoke with Kadima and Likud leaders on Monday, added that he does not intend to make any hasty decisions. "Tomorrow the faction will convene, we will appoint a negotiations team and we will make decisions," Lieberman said. "In this election, we set the agenda," he went on to say. "This is our biggest achievement, beyond any other achievement. Yisrael Beiteinu defined what the correct agenda is and what the central issue is "loyalty."

So it's now a waiting game. Waiting for the publication of the official results (scheduled for next Thursday 19.Feb), so the President (Shimon Peres) may begin determining who to invite to form the next government. Waiting for Lieberman to decide who he'll support/recommend to be PM. Then, waiting for the horse trading to create the new coalition government.

Whatever happens, and I suspect that it'll be a rightest government rather than some form of national unity government with all three large parties and a rotating PM between Livni and Netanyahu, the country and its political system remains impotent and broken. Despite some calls for a merger of Kadima and Labour, the country remains split and undecided as to how the country needs to be governed.

I also suspect that Shas and possibly also UTJ will be invited to join the coalition which will cost the country too much financially and further stifle modernizing the country--enacting civil marriage and better 'control' over the Rabbinic court system, as well as pushing a greener Israel.
Whatever government is created, no one from the public will be asked to ratify it but, will be left to cover its costs and bills.

While I recognize that the public has spoken and that it doesn't really speak to me, it will speak for me and, thus, it deserves my respect. Unfortunately, I can't see the new government doing much good. Its policies will be regressive--socially and economically as well as relating to the rest of the world--and will set the country back.

Random thoughts of the day

Election day was a relatively quiet one.

I went to vote around 10:30 am. I went right into the polling station and voted. The other polls had medium length lines. At 16:00, it was reported that the turnout was above the last election (around 42%). The 21:00 news opened with a turnout slightly under 60% (59.4). Not a huge turnout considering that the day was a civic holiday--no work, no school ...

Outside the voting place I met several parties attempting to convince to vote for them, Kadima, Likud, Meretz and Green-Meimad. When I volunteered outside the voting station, at 19:00, it was just Greens-Meimad for a long time. Meretz showed up later. I guess by the evening when the weather turned really cold and rainy, only the diehards were fighting for votes.

Whether or not the Green Movement-Meimad will, in the end, pass the voting threshold remains up in the air (it's now 22:15 and the TV stations have released their projections and it appears that G-M is out of the Knessset). Too bad.

A few issues that I percolated upon today:

1. The surprise election winner: The last three elections have had one party--previously viewed as fringe--made a impressive showing. The last time it was the Pensioner Party (7 seats). The time before, it was Shinui (Tommy Lapid 1st election as its leader) which won 8. Today, I expected that it would be the Green Movement-Meimad. In the end, it may turn out to be Avigdor Leiberman/Yisrael Beitanu.

• As difficult as it is to make the breakthrough, the real challenge is to repeat the success. In previous cases, the party for all intents and purposes disappeared from the map either during the sitting Knesset or the next elections. It splintered--both Shinui and the Pensioners--and fizzled out. (Shinui did appear in the subsequent Knesset, though no longer in the government.) It was a flash in the pan and not a paradigm shift of Israeli political life.
• Part of the difficulty of staying the course was an inability to put aside personal (and personality) politics for the sake of building up the party structure and policies. In both cases, the charisma of the leader was an integral component of its success. Once in power, the other 'leaders' wanted their time in the sun (i.e. ego issues).

2. Voting for a "fringe party" (one not expected to enter the Knesset) is a vote for the stronger parties and a wasted vote (since it's not considered a valid vote--it's not counted).

• For me, I didn't (and still don't) see any significant difference between the three large parties. All three will include Lieberman (extreme right-wing, even racist politician, whose also had his share of criminal investigations including one currently underway which could lead to an indictment for money laundering), especially if he gets 15+ seats. A matter-of-fact, there was no real/actual vote that could have prevented him [Lieberman] from being the balance of power -- a senior member of the cabinet and the effective determinant of who will be Prime Minister. To suggest otherwise--as someone told me outside the polling station--to be delusional (unlike naive as I was called, because I voted for a small party).
• None of the major parties expressed any real interest, either in policy statements or in their past behaviours, in domestic issues beyond taxes and government allowances. Their focus was on external affairs -- the military, the Israel-Arab (Palestinian Authority, Hamas, Hizbollah, Syria ...) conflict. As such, I expect that all three--despite their campaign posture and rhetoric--will behave the same way. If, when, international pressure is applied--especially by the US--territories will be evacuated, negotiations will be conducted with all for establishing 'peace treaties', etc.
• Missing from all three is a serious domestic agenda. No one really spoke about education, environmental issues or closing the socio-economic gaps. I felt that the Greens-Meimad, davka, did address those issues. Unfortunately, either the issues didn't really resonate with the electorate or got lost in the push for larger parties.
• The leadership of the three large parties were uninspiring. While none really discussed recycling and other green issues, they practiced recycling of people (Barak and Netanyahu were part PMs) if not solid waste. The idea of having to vote for a large party because of a need for a stable (less smaller parties) government, works only on the theoretical level. On the practical level, it turns my stomach. Until the larger parties actually become accountable to the population and not the central committee / primary voters, little change in the quality of politics and political leadership can be expected.
• Lastly, the current political reality, stable governments remain more an exception than the the rule. Governments will rely on fickle (self-interested) partners who on a moments notice either over a policy difference (how it'll be cloaked) or personal slight (most likely) will bolt the coalition and force new elections. The four year term of office is more a hope or aspiration than a fact of political life. If correct, there's no real advantage voting for a large party. It doesn't speak for the larger public, to the important public concerns, nor present needed leadership.

Will discuss potential governing scenarios shortly.

The day before ...

As it turns out, today—Tu BeShevat (the new years for trees)—among other things is the anniversary of the first Knesset meeting in its own building (13.3.1950) in the "Beit Froumine" building on King George Street in Jerusalem. (Today it's the Jerusalem Rabbinical Court and before that the Ministry of Tourism.) It's an opportune time to reflect on tomorrow's elections for the 18th Knesset.

To carry the metaphor further. The seeds planted up until today, will start to bear its fruit tomorrow. (Today also has a personal twist. It's my paternal grandfather's 39th yahrzeit and would have been my Dad's 77th birthday. Both serve as my roots and primordial seed.)

Conventional wisdom is that Benjamin Netanyahu (Bibi) and the Likud party will form the next government. His coalition government will be right of center—Likud, Israel Beiteinu (Avigdor Leiberman), HaBayit HaYehudi [the new NRP], and the National Union. Together they're predicted to have around 68 seats.

What I don't want is a "wall-to-wall" coalition. The more parties included the higher the price exacted for their support, as each party demands its 'ransom'. This is especially true for the haredi (ultra-orthodox) parties who want money for their educational systems—which operate outside of meaningful (if at all) government supervision—and their pet projects. It also applies to other narrow special interests groups too. The time has come for the national interests to trump special interests. Money should be devoted to strengthening the general Israeli infrastructure; upgrading the public school systems—from nursery through graduate education, creating a real and meaningful (helpful) social welfare net, public transportation and better green technology from better solid waste management to green (renewable) energy and technology.

There’s also a real place for a real opposition. One that will offer viable policy and governing (legislation and priorities) alternatives for public consideration, hold the government accountable for its policies and make the Knesset an actual governing body instead of a rubber stamp for the government/cabinet decisions.

The polls have consistently shown Likud leading the race. However, their lead has been cut from a high of projected 35 seats to something closer to 27. In large part by Avigdor Leiberman coming from the hard right especially among the teen/younger voters and also by Tzippi Livni and the Kadima party attempting to come from the left (center). It also doesn't hurt—though I'm not it's really that much of a help considering how hated he is by most of the country (and me!)--that Ehud Olmert finally endorsed Tzippi Livni for Prime Minister yesterday.

So, whoever wins the plurality of the seats, the challenge will be to create a viable and stable coalition government.

Complicating matters is that 33(!) parties—each with their own electoral symbol (from one to three letters)—are running for the 120 seats. The Jerusalem Post created a guide for the voter on Friday. Haaretz discussed the smaller fringe parties on Sunday. Then there the medium sized parties who'll certainly get enough votes (>2.5% of valid ballots cast) to get a few seats and expect to be part of the government—if the governing party will pay their asking price.

I continue to believe that Shas who (a) refused to have a female PM and (b) demanded too high a price--which they cloaked in a demand for higher family (children) allowances, caused the current election. (And, then had the hutzpa to suggest that Livni forced the election and doesn't care about families.)

As it turns out, the party I'm supporting, the Green Movement-Meimad, was included as a viable party (i.e. potential for getting a couple of seats) in the election in the Post article, despite not being included on any the poll results. Ya.

Polls seem to skew towards already existing parties and the larger parties. I received a computer-generated phone call asking me which I supported/will vote for. After mentioning the "usual suspects", it stopped and didn't even have an option for "other". I'm also not sure that polls take into account the undecided or not voting blocs into their projected results. Taking the latter in, which is frequently larger than the 'margin of error', presents a clearer picture of the probabilities and might even encourage those on the fence to decide vote (and for whom). Or... maybe that's too complicated for people.

As much as I would like to see a smaller number of parties contesting Israeli elections, I’m not sure the larger parties or the general Israeli polity/population seems willing or able to commit to that.

• The voting threshold needs to be raised to close to 5%, from its current 2 2.5% level, coupled with
• Some form of direct elections are needed, either on a regional basis or ‘traditional’ electoral riding/constituencies, to be augmented by ‘proportional representation’ by parties.

Unfortunately, the three larger parties—Kadima, Labour and Likud—refuse to use their collective strength (a majority of the Knesset seats) to enact such a bill. Maybe they’re afraid of offending the smaller, usually ‘balance of power’ parties and they won’t support them in the future. It’s baseless on several counts:

1. Only the small fringe parties, see the list below) would be excluded from the Knesset, as they are already.
2. The collective weight of the big three ensures its passage.
3. Parties with large scale either geographic concentrations or national support will continue to be elected to the Knesset. At minimum to the party seats and those with a geographic concentration or bloc voting, should also win some direct elections.

As it stands now, the thirty-three parties can be divided into three groups: the large Blocs (Kadima, Labour and Likud) who serve as the senior government partner(s), the medium sized parties and the nuisance parties (those too small to pass the voter threshold). The combination is lethal and makes elections and voting confusing.

A. Large [3]

• Likud
• Labour
• Kadima

B. Medium [15]

(a) 7+ seats:
Left: Meretz, the Arab parties combined [UAL/Tal, Balad].
Right: Israel Beiteinu
Religious: UTJ (the Ashkenazi haredim), Shas (the Sefardi haredim)
(b) 3-7 seats:
Right: National Union, HaBayit Hayehudi [aka NRP]
Left: Hadash (communist and Arab-Jewish)
(c) on the cusp/2-3 seats (minimum number):
Green Movement-Meimad, the Green Party and (in this election) the Pensioners

C. Nuisance [18]

• Israel Hazaka (fighting organized crime)
• Zomet
• Or (secular)
• 2 parties committed to legalizing marijuana [Green Leaf and the Holocaust Survivors (who joined up with a Green Leaf break off)
• 2 parties committed to electoral reforms [Israelim and Responsibility]
• Da’am (Arab workers’)
• 3 Russian immigrant parties [Leader, Lev and Israeli Renewal]
• Tzabar (young people)
• Men’s Rights
• Power for Handicapped
• Lechem (on behalf the poor)
• Power of Money (anti-banks)
• Lazuz (corruption) and
• Brit Olam (joint Jewish-Arab committed to a Palestinian state, separation of religion and the state)

Complicating matters further is that seats are assigned according to the votes deemed “valid”. Voting either a “white slip” (no party), a defaced ballot or for party that fails to garner enough to pass the threshold is not considered a valid vote/ballot. To get around this, parties sign “overflow votes” agreements. Those two parties then have access to the others ‘extra’ votes (beyond the precise number required for each seat/mandate) which are used to increase the votes for the bigger party providing them with an additional seat, or two.

Now you know all this, are you now excited to see how it all turns out?

More later—tomorrow with my first impressions, later on when the official results are published (Paper ballot take a while for formal approval.)

The morning after...

It's now been a full day of US President Barack Obama.

The press has focused on three issues:

1. Evaluating his inaugural address (and the next day too) and the inauguration ceremony itself.
2. Evaluating his first day in office -- is he really up to the job?
3. How will it address the issues it must now confront, during its first hundred days and beyond. More broadly, what kind of presidency can be expected -- policies, image of the Presidency -- what kind of changes in government and American life?

1.

The speech was impressive in that it set out a path--mood setting--without really presenting any specific agenda items or plans. While it was in some ways a rebuke of the atmosphere of the last eight years (the George W Bush presidency), it was also an announcement that there's a (new) reality that America needs to confront, both domestically and internationally. Unfortunately, I didn't hear it live, but I did view it later and read it online.

Instead of commenting on the entire speech--you may read it for yourself--two sections deserve special comment.

(a) the popular call for a sense of personal responsibility that many others have commented upon:

For as much as government can do and must do, it is ultimately the faith and determination of the American people upon which this nation relies.

It is the kindness to take in a stranger when the levees break; the selflessness of workers who would rather cut their hours than see a friend lose their job which sees us through our darkest hours.

It is the firefighter's courage to storm a stairway filled with smoke, but also a parent's willingness to nurture a child, that finally decides our fate.

Our challenges may be new, the instruments with which we meet them may be new, but those values upon which our success depends, honesty and hard work, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism -- these things are old.

... What is demanded then is a return to these truths. What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility -- a recognition, on the part of every American, that we have duties to ourselves, our nation and the world, duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly, firm in the knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so defining of our character than giving our all to a difficult task.

This is the price and the promise of citizenship.

(b) Far more interesting for me was his comments about the role of government:

What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them, that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long, no longer apply.

The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works, whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified.

Where the answer is yes, we intend to move forward. Where the answer is no, programs will end.

And those of us who manage the public's dollars will be held to account, to spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do our business in the light of day, because only then can we restore the vital trust between a people and their government.

I believe that no society can function without a supervisory body, a government, to maintain order and 'fairness' and to ensure the provision of common/community services. While I'm not sure without a government, it will be a "Hobbesian hell" where people are eating each other up, it does seem clear that society can't function efficiently without it. For better or worse, government is part of our lives. If that's indeed a given, then the question is how can it be structured to better ensure the greatest good? Bloated uncaring government bureaucracies are a drag. Insufficient oversight (complete laissez-faire) will also be a drag on functioning (as witnessed by the financial meltdown created by an ideological mindset of self-regulated financial sector under Bush).

People need to be held accountable for their behavior and actions. At the same time, they also need to know that things beyond their control, but necessary for their functioning will be taken care of. Leaving side the major responsibility for defending the country and maintaining social order, governments also need to protect their most vulnerable population(s) by providing them with the basic services to live a dignified life including health care, education, social services.

This will be of even more importance as America seeks to pull itself of the morass of its economic downturn ("depression"), as well as its international standing. Everyone will need to feel a sense of ownership and honestly pull their own weight. The automatic sense of unique or special entitlement must end, for everyone is responsible for righting the boat without regard for station.

2 & 3

He has certainly assembled an impressive supporting cast of cabinet members and advisers. Few are shrinking violets and when (if?) confirmed the meetings will probably be loud and boisterous affairs with everyone expressing their opinion. Will Obama be able to sift through the expected conflicting advice and distill the best policy/decision? No matter how experienced the supporting cast, Obama will still has a steep learning curve.

He needs to avoid making a "Bay of Pigs" incident--something planned in the previous administration and left over to the next to enact--which tripped up JFK and probably lead to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Unlike few before him, he has a large number of crisis balls in the air to juggle. FDR needed to address the economic situation--The Great Depression. JFK had a foreign policy issues around the Cold War (including Cuba, Vietnam). Obama needs to address foreign and domestic issues.

Eventually, the glow and "honeymoon" will end when the effects of the hard decisions sink in and the inertia of resisting changes reach a crescendo.

The morning after is just the first day of the presidency and the start of the journey. We'll see.

The Mourning after ...

The dust is beginning to settle on the Gaza war between Israel and Hamas. The ceasefire is generally holding -- Israel has claimed to have completely removed its soldiers (though many are still deployed along the border just in case), there's only sporadic firing on Israel, outsiders including media and international observers (e.g. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon) are coming for "visits"-- so the focus is now on dissecting its results and creating a new future.

The New York Times has dedicated a "room for debate" blog thread to the issue. The Globe & Mail (Canada) reports how angry the UN Secretary-General is following his tour of the damage. CNN has sent its reporter Ben Wedeman to survey the damage and speak to the people. Few in the world has a kind thing to say about Israel or a critical comment about Hamas' behavior in using human shields or use of neutral sites (a UNWRA school, hospitals or residential neighborhoods) to fire upon Israeli military and civilian (over the border) targets. Oh, well...

Was this inevitable? Hamas by merely surviving the Israeli onslaught and not folding won the war? That Israel, whatever, the legitimate causes for going to war was the loser?

To better evaluate the results, it would be interesting to see what was written before or early in the war.

The International Crisis Group published a briefing "Ending the War in Gaza", Middle East Briefing No. 26, 5 January 2009 (pdf). In it, they evaluate the three major players in the conflict--Hamas, the Palestinian Authority (Fatah and Mahmud Abbas) in "the West Bank"and Israel -- and their interests and prospects in engaging in war/conflict.

They write:

1.Hamas

Hamas might not have wished for a full-scale confrontation. There are indications it believed its brinkmanship would force Egypt to mediate a new ceasefire agreement entailing opening of the crossings and persuade Israel to accept it. Three days after the ceasefire’s expiration, a Hamas leader in Gaza said, “there is a previous agreement on the truce with conditions that have not
been met by Israel..." ... The Islamist movement arguably wagered that a steady stream of rockets could force that outcome at minimal cost to itself. But if all-out war was not intended, it was deemed an alternative preferable to the status quo. Hamas leaders made clear that perpetuation of the existing situation was tantamount to renewal of a one-sided ceasefire ... “our strategy is to end the siege using all means”.

[A]s Hamas leaders plainly saw it, a confrontation carried potential benefits. Speaking in the wake of Israel’s attack, a Hamas spokesperson in Lebanon said:

We didn’t really have a choice. It was either die slowly because of the blockade or more quickly due to confrontation. Israel was telling us, “accept the blockade that is killing you”. Despite all the suffering, this aggression put an end to a more painful situation. Now, the whole world is seeing that Palestinians are being killed. Before, people would die and no one would take note.

For Hamas, they were not only fighting Israel but also Egypt--for keeping the Rafah crossing closed--and the Palestinian Authroity in the West Bank.

Israel is not the only party blamed. While anger toward Israel was predictable, outrage at Egypt and the PA does not lag far behind. A Hamas supporter said, "Abbas and [Egyptian President Hosni] Mubarak are using civilians in Gaza to
teach Hamas a lesson”. At Gaza City’s Shifa hospital, victims’ families curse Abbas and Mubarak with no less vehemence than they do Israel; a woman crying over her two children – one dead, one brain-damaged – accused them of “killing innocent people in Gaza to teach Hamas a lesson”. None of this should be viewed as necessarily translating into support for Hamas; many still resent the movement for its failures in government, its bloody takeover and repressive means. Another grieving woman, who also had lost children, cried that she hoped that “God will exterminate Hamas”. But, in many quarters, the intensity of Israel’s attacks, the feeling of betrayal at the hands of Egypt as well as the PA and Hamas’s steadfastness for now are playing into the Islamic movement’s hands.In the end,Should Hamas nonetheless be in a position where it no longer can effectively rule Gaza – a situation Israel might create intentionally or unwittingly – a movement leader claims it will simply go nderground and “revert to its original state as a resistance movement”. During the Egyptian
reconciliation drive and again in the wake of the ceasefire [the six month one which was in effect until shortly before the war], senior Hamas leaders repeatedly emphasised that preserving the movement was more important than preserving the Gaza government.

2. The Palestinian Authority/West Bank

The Palestinian Authority and Fatah are not involved in the current Israeli-Hamas confrontation and yet – or as a result – they (especially the former) currently are emerging as among its more notable losers. Abbas in particular is in a delicate spot, unable either to play a significant role or
find the right words.

In the end,

The final impact of events in Gaza on the West Bank remains unclear. What is less uncertain is the toll it is taking on the PA leadership’s fortunes. Mustafa Barghouti, a former presidential candidate and head of the Palestinian National Initiative, put it characteristically bluntly:

The current crisis demonstrates to many that Abbas is incapable of representing or protecting his people. If he has good relations with the U.S., why can’t he stop an assault on his own people? If he doesn’t have good relations with the U.S., then what has he been doing the last four years? Good relations with the U.S. was his whole program. Likewise, if negotiations with Israel are not working, he should resign; if negotiations are working, why is Israel doing this to Gaza?

3. Israel

Israel, too, was dissatisfied with the ceasefire, especially as it applied to returning Gilad Shalit and opening of the border crossings (for aid). Nonetheless, they did hope that the ceasefire would somehow be renewed, Israel--though Defence Minister Ehud Barak--held its fire despite the massive increase in rocket fire immediately following the cessation of the ceasefire.

At the core though, was their need

not to give in to Hamas’s insistence that they be opened.

For Israel, it was important to persuade not only Hamas but others in the region that the Islamist movement could not extract concessions through violence ...

Additionally, though in the background, the upcoming Israeli elections on 10 Feb, also informed the planning process and response. Barak needed to present himself as THE military leader different from Amir Peretz and a positive model following the debacle of the 2nd Lebanon War with Hizbollah (2006). Each party needed to ensure that going to war won't backfire on them.

“Going to war in an election period is not a wise move. One knows how to get into a war but not how to get out. The whole thing can turn upside down very easily. Barak simply felt he has to do it, and do it now, in order to achieve the main goal – stopping the fire on Sderot and the south”. Regardless of the electoral season, virtually any Israeli government would have felt compelled to react.

[Yet] ... reluctant to act, Barak went all-out once the decision was made. The initial bombardment from air and sea elicited widespread satisfaction in military circles. It targeted the locations of Hamas’s rule over Gaza: police stations on the first day, killing over 200 Palestinians, the highest recorded number in a single day in the occupied Palestinian territories since 1967; the tunnel supply lines on the second; and homes of Hamas leaders and government buildings on subsequent ones. ...

A key lesson Barak drew from the 2006 Lebanon War is the crucial importance
of who is seen as victor and who as loser. He believes Israel’s power of deterrence decreased in the Second Lebanon War. He will, therefore, not allow this campaign not to reach its objectives or to end with the appearance of an Israeli defeat ...

With time, earlier reported differences between security officials seeking a prompt exit strategy and politicians aspiring to reshape the political map appear to have considerably narrowed. The emerging consensus centres on an air and land campaign aimed not only at ending rocket fire but also at destroying or at least seriously impairing Hamas’s long-range rocket capabilities, security apparatus and longer-term threat potential, halting or seriously reducing weapons smuggling and barring any Hamas activity within a perimeter of several hundred metres from Israeli borders.

The options confronting Israel are multiple. The question is how much damage can be inflicted upon Hamas and its leadership which would temper its terrorist behavior while not creating a real power vacuum that no one of real stature can fill? How can it avoid getting itself stuck in an occuation mode? Does it have the wherewithal to strike quickly and effectively and then get itself out of ythe Gaza morass to the "applause of the world community"?

In terms of press coverage, it hasn't been good. Even American TV, Meet the Press (4 January), was highly critical of the Israeli actions--be it its limiting access to foreign press, its attacks responding to Hamas fire upon "innocent civilians" (though it's difficult to ascertain/verify whose a dressed up Hamas fighter and who's the innocent bystander).

And the bush was consumed

Tonight is the last (full) day of the presidency of George W Bush, and in the bow to last week's parshat hashavua and the burning bush, this blog is dedicated to some thoughts on the change of government in the US (as well as taking a break from discussing the Gaza War).

With the inauguration of Barack Obama tomorrow, a new era will come to America and, hopefully, to the rest of the world.

It is as though divine intervention is involved this year in the changing of the American government. Today is Martin Luther King Jr Day (and also "National Community Service Day") and tomorrow is Inauguration Day. One day dedicated to the loss of a great American who dedicated his life to social justice and the betterment of all Americans, the next dedicated to the hope of seeing some of those dreams being put into action. The expectations of (and on) Barack Obama is enormous.

Before looking forward, it may be helpful to look back to establish a "baseline."

Many have commented on the Bush presidency like EJ Dionne "Bush's Biggest Mistake" (or "Why the Uniter Divided Us"), Dana Milbank and Fareed Zakaria in The Washington Post. In The New York Times, Paul Krugman critiqued his economic policies, Mauren Dowd. Dan Froomkin's "The White House Watch" (a personal favorite) detailed the numerous foibles throughout his administration

For EJ Dionne Jr, the issue was

From the very beginning of his presidency, won courtesy of a divisive Supreme Court decision that abruptly ended his contest with Al Gore, Bush misunderstood the nature of his lease on power, the temper of the country and the proper role of partisanship in our political life. His win-at-all-costs strategy in Florida became a template for much of his presidency, reflected especially in the way the Justice Department was politicized.

Bush did not respect the obligation of a leader in a free society to forge a durable consensus. He was better at announcing policies than explaining them. He dismissed legitimate opposition and plausible doubts about the courses he wished to pursue. It is partly because of these failures that Americans reacted by selecting a successor with such a profoundly different political personality.

Eugene Robinson in turn opined:

Not to kick the president on his way out the door, but he was wrong when he told White House reporters at a wistful, nostalgic news conference yesterday that "there is no such thing as short-term history."

It's true that some presidencies look different after a few decades. But it's also true that presidential acts can have immediate consequences -- and that George W. Bush will leave office next week as a president whose eight years in office are widely seen as a nadir from which it will take years to recover. ...

Asked to identify the biggest mistake of his presidency, Bush gave a curious answer that had more to do with public relations than presidential decision making. He mentioned the "Mission Accomplished" banner that prematurely announced the end of major conflict in Iraq -- but not his decision to invade Iraq in the first place. He mentioned his failure to visit New Orleans at the height of the devastating, deadly flooding caused by Hurricane Katrina -- but not the decision to entrust the Federal Emergency Management Agency to the hapless and ineffective Michael Brown.In Bush's mind, the revelation of shocking prisoner abuse by U.S. military guards at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq was "a huge disappointment" -- but he doesn't take any responsibility, as commander in chief, for the atmosphere of lax training and supervision that allowed the abuses at Abu Ghraib to happen. The failure by U.S. forces to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq qualifies only as "a significant disappointment" -- even though the administration's apocalyptic rhetoric about WMD was what sealed the deal for an invasion and occupation that never should have taken place.

Fareed Zakaria in "He Kept Us Safe, but..." writes:

"He kept us safe."

That has become the mantra to explain why George W. Bush -- contrary to the view of the American public, people abroad and historians -- is actually a great man. For Dick Cheney, unsurprisingly, Bush will rank "among the most decisive, determined and far-seeing leaders this nation has ever had." ...

At some level, it is not surprising that Bush's acolytes should focus on just this one issue. It is difficult to make the claim on other grounds, such as the economy, the traditional measure used by presidents. Bush inherited the most favorable economic fortunes of any president in two generations. In 2000, the Clinton administration presented the nation with a budget almost in balance -- a $17 billion deficit. The Congressional Budget Office was projecting $5.6 trillion in surpluses over the next 10 years. But within a year, most of those surpluses had been frittered away in an
extravagant set of tax cuts. At the end of eight years -- by common consent -- Bush is leaving the country in the worst economic and fiscal shape it has been in since the
1970s or the 1930s.

Under Bush, America has been put on a quasi-war footing, has spent billions on "homeland security," has massively complicated its immigration and visa system, has put friction into the gears of trade, has retreated from its open attitude toward foreigners, and has seen its Constitution circumvented. But Bush has kept us safe. I hope that when Barack Obama thinks about the challenges he faces -- the economy, health care, energy, Iraq and Afghanistan -- he does not obsessively focus on the metric of "keeping us safe."

Dan Froomkin in "The Bush Verdict is in" (WP January 13, 2009) summed up the Bush presidency by writing,

He took the nation to a war of choice under false pretenses -- and left troops in harm's way on two fields of battle. He embraced torture as an interrogation tactic and turned the world's champion of human dignity into an outlaw nation and international pariah. He watched with detachment as a major American city went under water. He was ostensibly at the helm as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression took hold. He went from being the most popular to the most disappointing president, having squandered a unique opportunity to unite the country and even the world behind a shared agenda after Sept. 11.

He set a new precedent for avoiding the general public in favor of screened audiences and seemed to occupy an alternate reality. He took his own political party from seeming permanent majority status to where it is today. And he deliberately politicized the federal government, circumvented the traditional policy making process, ignored expert advice and suppressed dissent, leaving behind a broken government.

From a different perspective, see Maureen Dowd in "The Long, Lame Goodbye" (NYT January 17, 2009) who in offering a more psychological analysis in comparing the out-going Bush with the in-coming Obama wrote:

As Barack Obama got to town, one of the first things he did was seek the
counsel of past presidents, including George Bush senior.

As W. was leaving town, one of the last things he did was explain why he never sought the counsel of his father on issues that his father knew intimately, like Iraq and Saddam. ...

W. lives in the shadow of his father’s presence, while Obama lives in the shadow of his father’s absence. W.’s parlous presidency, spent trashing the Constitution, the economy and the environment, was bound up, and burdened by, the psychological traits of an asphyxiated and pampered son. The exiting and entering presidents are
opposite poles — one the parody of a monosyllabic Western gunslinger who disdains nuance, and one a complex, polysyllabic professor sort who will make a decision only after he has held it up to the light and examined it from all sides.

W. was immune to doubt and afraid of it. (His fear of doubt led to the cooking of war intelligence.) Obama is delighted by doubt.

Bush fancied himself the Decider; Obama fancies himself the Convener. Some worry that a President Obama will overdo it and turn the Situation Room into the Seminar Room. (He’s already showing a distressing lack of concern over whether his cherished eggheads bend the rules, like Tim Geithner’s not paying all his taxes, because, after all, they’re the Best and the Brightest, not ordinary folk.)

W., Cheney and Rummy loved making enemies, under the mistaken assumption that the more people hated America, the more the Bushies were standing up for principle. But is Obama neurotically reluctant to make enemies, and overly concerned with winning over those who have smacked him, from Hillary and Bill to conservative
columnists?

Whatever goodwill America generated in its history and immediately following 9/11 were lost and burned in the "bush fire" of the last eight years. For the Phoenix to rise again, the lessons of the Bush years must be identified, internalized and 'operationalized' in the running of the Obama White House.

Bob Woodward in last Sunday's (18 Jan 2009) Washington Post using his experience observing and writing about the Bush years, and believing that Presidents live in the unfinished business of their predecessors, presented the 10 lessons Obama needs to take away from the Bush experience if he hopes to correct "the errors" of the last administration.

1. Presidents set the tone. Don't be passive or tolerate virulent divisions.
2. The president must insist that everyone speak out loud in front of the others, even -- or especially -- when there are vehement disagreements.
3. A president must do the homework to master the fundamental ideas and concepts
behind his policies. (The president should not micromanage, but understanding the ramifications of his positions cannot be outsourced to anyone.)
4. Presidents need to draw people out and make sure that bad news makes it to the
Oval Office, (including specifically asking their opinions and not assume or rely on second-hand information).
5. Presidents need to foster a culture of skepticism and doubt. ...While Presidents and generals don't have to live on doubt. But they should learn to love it.
6. Presidents get contradictory data, and they need a rigorous way to sort it out.
7. Presidents must tell the public the hard truth, even if that means delivering very bad news ... A president is strong when he is the voice of realism.
8. Righteous motives are not enough for effective policy.
9. Presidents must insist on strategic thinking. ... a willingness to pay a short-term price for the sort of long-term gains that go down in the history books ... [as a] President will probably be judged by the success of his long-range plans, not his daily crisis management.
10. The president should embrace transparency. (Some version of the behind-the-scenes story of what happened in his White House will always make it out to the public -- and everyone will be better off if that version is as accurate as possible.) ...
[To do so t]hey should run an internal, candid process of debate and discussion with key advisers that will make sense when it surfaces later. This sort of inside account will be told, at least in part, during the presidency. But the best obtainable version will emerge more slowly, over time, and become history.

Let's hope and pray that Obama takes the lessons to heart and the rest of world allows Obama to be himself and not the "Second Coming". A mere correction will also go a long way to setting the world straight.