This evening [Thursday
25.10.2012] the Likud and Yisrael
Beiteinu parties announced they have unified and will run as one list in
the upcoming Israeli elections.
Is this the start of
electoral reform--the start of creating large political blocs to govern
Israel--or an act of desperation by either or both parties?
On one hand, there is an
expectation that the merger will lead to sizable majority of seats. As Jonathan
Liss in Haaretz writes:
Yisrael Beiteinu officials
estimate that the unification should earn them at least 50 mandates in the
upcoming election, and allow the new party to create a strong, stable
government, without having to cater to other parties demands in exchange for
votes.
That
part sounds good. An end to cobbling together smaller parties--each exacting
its ransom (extortion) to join the government--to reach a majority government.
On the
other hand, the idea that two large egos, Netanyahu and Lieberman, who has
sparred with each other for the last decade or two to see who is the real
leader of "The Right" will actually commit to working together for
the next few months (of the campaign) never mind the next four years (the term
of office). My sense is someone sees this as just another battle of a
larger war for supremacy. The whole exercise implode creating a bigger
mess than currently exists.
This
could also create a renewed opportunity for the other parties especially for
the not-right wing parties.
It's a big gambit, as Chami Shalev discusses.
According to press reports, Netanyahu is relying on public opinion polls that promise his joint list with Lieberman between 40-45 Knesset seats, within the same range as the 42 seats currently held by the Likud and Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu combined. Such a result would ensure that the Likud-Beiteinu list, as it is now called, will be the biggest in the next Knesset and that Netanyahu will be the certain candidate to form the next coalition.
But Netanyahu should know better than most that political polling of hypothetical situations is notoriously unreliable, because it fails to take into account the influence of the new entities on the other actors in the arena. By desperately seeking a master stroke that would counter Likud’s slide in the polls, Netanyahu may have forgotten what sociologist Robert K Merton described as the “imperious immediacy of interest” from which the law of unintended consequence ensues.
- Will the
Russian supporters of Yisrael Beiteinu shift their votes to
Likud or find another olim [immigrant] party to support?
- Will traditional North African voters,
hitherto the bedrock of Likud support, remain loyal to the
Netanyahu-Lieberman combo – or will they cry “the Russians are coming, the
Russians are coming” and flock to Shas and to its old-new icon, Aryeh
Deri?
- What about the bloc of so-called
“Feiglinim”, the right-wing settlers in the Likud who had been poised for
a power grab in the upcoming Likud primaries and who have now been
outflanked by Lieberman? Will they stay or will they go further to the
right?
- How will the last vestiges of the old
Likud guard, who still swear by the rule of law and adhere to what is
known as “Jabotinskyite majesty” - people such as Michael Eitan, Dan
Meridor and even Benny Begin – how will they react to having someone like
Lieberman, whom they have all castigated at one time or another, catapulted
to the top? Perhaps they will join forces and add legitimacy to the
new Olmert or Livni led center?
- Will this union galvanize
despondent center-left voters, hitherto resigned to their bloc’s
inevitable defeat in the upcoming elections, and increase pressures on
former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and/or former Foreign Minister Tzipi
Livni to return to politics in order to rally and unite the troops and
lead the charge against the Lieberman-led right?
Then,
will Lieberman's presence serve as a distraction or thorn to outsiders and
those trying to spin Israel in a positive light? My sense is that Lieberman's
public persona is problematic. While being direct
and controversial helps generate press and attention to your
political agenda, it's not helpful when dealing with diplomacy and an already
hostile foreign press/media.
Lastly,
with Lieberman involved, one must always consider a Machiavellian subplot: Lieberman, after all, wants to be prime minister. He knows it, Netanyahu knows it, and they both know that each other knows it. Netanyahu may have embraced Lieberman in order to neutralize the possibility that the leader of Yisrael Beiteinu might decide to bolt the right and join a centrist coalition after the upcoming elections. Lieberman’s reasoning, in such a scenario, was supposed to be that once Netanyahu is firmly ensconced in the opposition, it would be easier for Lieberman to make his move and take over as leader of the right wing.
But what if Lieberman, a political animal with uncanny instincts, knows full well that Netanyahu is making a fatal mistake? In such a scenario, Netanyahu will lose the elections and probably leave politics, and Lieberman will be there, conveniently anointed and superbly placed, on time and exactly as planned.
I, too, don't trust Lieberman, so while the implications of
this union will take time to play out and over the next days and weeks we'll
learn more of how this came about, I haven't been convinced to vote for them.
The cards have yet to be
fully dealt.
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